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THE CONTRIBUTION OF EU LAW TO THE 
REGULATION OF ONLINE SPEECH
THE GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK CASE AND WHAT 
IT MEANS FOR ONLINE CONTENT REGULATION
Luc von Danwitz*
Internet regulation in the European Union (EU) is receiving significant 
attention and criticism in the United States. The European Court of Jus-
tice’s (ECJ) judgment in the case Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ire-
land, in which the ECJ found a take-down order against Facebook for de-
famatory content with global effect permissible under EU law, was closely 
scrutinized in the United States. These transsystemic debates are valuable 
but need to be conducted with a thorough understanding of the relevant le-
gal framework and its internal logic. This note aims to provide the context 
to properly assess the role the ECJ and EU law play in the regulation of 
online speech. The note argues that the alleged shortcomings of the Glaw-
ischnig-Piesczek case are actually the result of a convincing interpretation 
of the applicable EU law while respecting the prerogatives of the member 
states in the areas of speech regulation, jurisdiction, and comity. Most of 
the issues that commentators wanted the ECJ to decide were beyond its 
reach in this case. The paper argues that EU law’s contribution in the field 
of online speech regulation should be regarded as a realization of the dan-
gers of illegal online content, resulting in an effective protection of the in-
terests harmed. This implies the rejection of a “whack-a-mole” approach 
towards illegal online content in favor of more effective ways to protect 
against the harm caused by illegal online speech. At the same time, the case 
highlights the necessity to establish a workable theory of jurisdiction and 
comity in the digital age.
Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................... 168
I. Glawischnig-Piesczek—The Case and the Judgment ............. 171
A. The Case ................................................................................ 171
B The Judgment......................................................................... 172
II. A Brief Overview of the Relevant EU Internet Law ....... 174
A. The Market and the Individual............................................... 174
B. In Particular: The E-Commerce Directive 2000/31 .............. 176
III. Making Sense of GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK ................................. 177
168 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:167
A. A Focus on the Protection of Interests Harmed by Illegal 
Content................................................................................... 177
1. Uncertainties Surrounding art. 15 ECD Before 
Glawischnig-Piesczek ..................................................... 177
2. Specific Monitoring Obligations—A Broad but 
Controllable Notion ........................................................ 179
3. Recognizing the Dangers of Social Networks ................ 180
4. Defining Identical and Equivalent Content..................... 181
5. A Lopsided Protection of Interests?................................ 183
B. The Problem of Automated Monitoring ................................. 184
C. The Curious Absence of Fundamental Rights........................ 187
1. Fundamental Rights Interests Involved........................... 188
2. Standard for the Applicability of the CFR...................... 188
3. Application to the Case................................................... 192
4. Fundamental Rights of ISPs............................................ 197
D. Global Removal Orders: Respecting the Limits of EU Law .. 199
1. A Bête Noire of Internet Regulation ............................... 199
2. Nothing to See Here: The ECD’s Silence on Global 
Removal Orders .............................................................. 201
3. Comparing Glawischnig-Piesczek to Google v. CNIL ... 203
IV. Impulses for Online Speech Regulation .............................. 205
A. Recognizing the Problem and the Provider’s
Responsibilities ...................................................................... 205
1. Of Moles and Aphids...................................................... 205
2. Any Impulses for U.S. Legislation?................................ 207
B. Enforcement and Power ........................................................ 209
Conclusion............................................................................................... 210
Introduction
With increasing regularity, the judiciary of the European Union (EU) is 
making headlines across the Atlantic. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ or “the Court”) may still seem to be “tucked away in the fairy-
land Duchy of Luxembourg”
1
for the general American public, but its rul-
* Licencié en droit (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), Mag. Iur. (Rheinische 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn), LL.M. (University of Michigan). Research fellow in 
the project “Handbook of Constitutional Law – German Constitutional Law from a Transna-
tional Perspective” at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, the 
University of Bonn, and the University of Freiburg. Contact: l.von-danwitz@csl.mpg.de. I 
would like to thank Prof. Daniel Halberstam for his useful insights and detailed comments on 
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Thanks to Dr. Andrew Woodhouse for helpful comments and Prof. Brian Willen for his fasci-
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1. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 1 (1981).
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ings become increasingly important for the United States, most notably in 
areas of regulation that challenge both the United States and the EU.
One such judgment was delivered in October 2019 in the case Eva 
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland.2 The judgment dealt with the 
sensitive topic of content removal from Facebook, specifically concerning 
defamatory speech directed against an Austrian politician. The ECJ allowed 
the Austrian Supreme Court to issue an injunction against Facebook with a 
global reach to take down content that was identical or equivalent to the ini-
tial content identified as defamatory under Austrian law. The case has been 
thoroughly commented on outside of Europe. The American response was 
overwhelmingly negative.
3
Topics that transcend jurisdictions, like online content regulation, can 
only benefit from a discourse across legal systems. Courts all over the world 
have struggled with similar questions. Competing visions for the future of 
the Internet are debated, tested, and rejected by lawmakers on all continents. 
External perspectives on local solutions with global consequences are ex-
tremely valuable. To be fruitful, however, such debates presuppose a thor-
ough understanding of the legal questions implicated. Accordingly, this note 
aims to provide the context necessary to understand the role of EU law and 
the ECJ in the regulation of online speech as exemplified by Glawischnig-
Piesczek. By undertaking a critical analysis of the judgment and its broader
regulatory context, this note will distill and critically evaluate the key take-
aways from the judgment, while pointing out the limits of EU law in this 
area.
This note shows that the provisions the ECJ interpreted in Glawischnig-
Piesczek focus exclusively on the obligations of intermediary service pro-
viders (ISPs) when confronted with illegal content. This severely limits the 
scope of the judgment. These obligations, the note suggests, were more nar-
rowly interpreted by the ECJ than a cursory reading of Glawischnig-
2. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct. 3, 2019). The final judgment in this case was delivered by the 
Austrian Supreme Court in 2020, ruling in favor of Ms. Glawischnig-Pisczek. See Oberster 
Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2020, 6 Ob 195/19y, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at
/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_20200915_OGH0002_0060OB00195_19Y0000_000/JJT_20200915_
OGH0002_0060OB00195_19Y0000_000.pdf.
3. See Jennifer Daskal & Kate Klonick, When a Politician Is Called a ‘Lousy Traitor,’
Should Facebook Censor It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/06/27/opinion/facebook-censorship-speech-law.html; Dominic Dhil Panakal, Europe’s
Bridge Too Far, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=521ee566-425c-4280-b0e0-ffafe6487b72; Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net: 
Internet Content Filters and the Advocate General’s Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ire-
land Opinion, STANFORD CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/Dolphins-in-the-Net-AG-Analysis.pdf; Daphne Keller, Fa-
cebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s Glawischnig-Piesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR
INT’L 616, 620–22 (2020); Daphne Keller (@daphnehk), TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/1179750220864745472.
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Piesczek might suggest. The note also maintains that EU law as it currently 
stands cannot get involved in the heated debate about when to regulate 
online speech, a question which is left to the EU member states. Also, the 
interpretation of the obligations of service providers, somewhat counterintu-
itively, mostly is not open to influence from the guarantee of the freedom of 
speech in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).
4
The note further 
maintains that allowing member states to issue orders to remove content 
with global effect shows due deference to the national competences in these 
areas, while also insisting on the applicable rules of comity and jurisdiction. 
With all this in mind, the note argues that the main contribution of EU law 
as interpreted by the ECJ to the debate around online content regulation is 
an emphasis on efficient removal of illegal content and the insistence on the 
responsibilities of service providers in that regard. The note does not pre-
tend to spell out and solve the difficult transatlantic relationship regarding 
Internet regulation. It merely attempts to set the record straight as far as the 
Glawischnig-Piesczek case is concerned and to present the contributions of 
this judgment to the ongoing regulatory debate.
This note begins in Part I with a brief description of the case, its proce-
dural background and the ECJ’s judgment. Part II then presents a broad 
overview of the general setting of EU Internet regulation, focusing on the E-
Commerce Directive (ECD)
5
which was at the heart of the case under re-
view. The judgment is then critically analyzed against the backdrop of the 
most prominent critiques brought forth by commentators in Part III. This 
includes the allegedly too broad interpretation of the obligations of service 
providers (Part III.A), the problem of automated monitoring (Part III.B), the 
perceived lack of considerations for fundamental rights involved (Part III.C) 
and the global effect of removal orders that the ECJ allows national injunc-
tions to have (Part III.D). The note proceeds in Part IV to present the main 
conclusions that should be drawn from the judgment and that should be tak-
en as the key contribution of EU law to the debate on online content regula-
tion around the world and its possible implications for the US legal and pol-
icy debate in particular.
4. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) 391 [hereinafter CFR].
5. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter ECD].
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I. Glawischnig-Piesczek—The Case and the Judgment
A. The Case6
A Facebook user publicly shared on their personal page an article from 
the Austrian online news site oe24.at, which described the Austrian Green 
Party’s support to maintain a minimum income for refugees. The article was 
shown as a thumbnail, including its title (“Greens: Minimum Income for 
Refugees Should Stay”), a summary of the article and a photograph of Ms. 
Glawischnig-Piesczek. At the time, she was a member of the Nationalrat 
(Austrian National Council) for the Austrian Green Party and its federal 
spokesperson. Along with the article, the user posted comments about Ms. 
Glawischnig-Piesczek, calling her a “lousy traitor of the people” (“miese 
Volksverräterin”),
7
“corrupt oaf” (“korrupter Trampel”), and a member of a 
“fascist party” (“Faschistenpartei”). Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek asked Face-
book Ireland
8
to remove this content, which Facebook Ireland did not do.
Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek obtained an injunction from the Vienna 
Commercial Court, which ordered Facebook to cease publication of Ms. 
Glawischnig-Piesczek’s photograph accompanied by the same or ‘equiva-
lent’ content. Facebook only took down the initial post in Austria. The Vi-
enna Higher Regional Court mostly upheld the order on appeal. It limited 
the obligation to take down equivalent content to content that was brought 
to the attention of Facebook but did not limit the injunction territorially to 
Austria. Both lower courts took the view that the posts were in violation of 
Sec. 78 UrhG (Law on Copyright) and Sec. 1330(1) ABGB (General Civil 
Code) and not protected by the freedom of expression.
Both parties appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court. This Court ex-
plicitly held that the statements at issue were intended to damage the appli-
cant’s reputation, to insult her and to defame her, which would justify an 
order to take down the initial posting. The Austrian Supreme Court stated 
that under Austrian law, a worldwide order to cease and desist that extended 
to identical or equivalent content would be permissible if the service pro-
6. Unless otherwise noted, this part relies on the presentation of the case in the Opin-
ion by Advocate General Szpunar. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland 
Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 10–21 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General 
Szpunar).
7. The term “Volksverräter”, though initially coined by revolutionaries and socialists 
dating back to the time before the German revolution of 1848, is today mainly understood as a 
reference to National Socialist Terminology. Volksverräter, DUDEN, https://www.duden.de
/rechtschreibung/Volksverraeter (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). The term was used to describe 
people involved in “high treason” according to §§ 80–93 of the German Penal Code. The in-
famous Volksgerichtshof (People’s Court) had special jurisdiction for these provisions and 
used them to sentence many German resistance fighters to death.
8. Facebook Ireland Ltd. is Facebook’s subsidiary for outside of the United States and 
Canada. Every user outside of the United States and Canada contracts with Facebook Ireland 
Ltd.
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vider was already aware that the interests of the applicant had been harmed 
on at least one occasion as a result of another user’s action, which demon-
strates the risk that other infringements could be committed. Importantly, it 
was not the ECJ who came up with the notions of identical or equivalent 
content, but the Austrian Supreme Court who decided that under national 
law, a removal order extending to these categories of content was appropri-
ate.
However, the Austrian Supreme Court was unsure whether this inter-
pretation of Austrian law would be in accordance with art. 15(1) ECD 
which reads: “Member States shall not impose a general obligation on pro-
viders, when providing [information society services], to monitor the infor-
mation which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to 
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”
In keeping with its obligation under art. 267(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
9
according to which any court 
of last instance must refer a question on the validity or interpretation of EU 
law pending before it to the ECJ,
10
the Austrian Supreme Court stayed the 
proceedings to refer questions on the interpretation of art. 15 ECD to the 
ECJ. The Austrian Supreme Court asked whether and to what extent art. 15 
ECD precludes national courts to order service providers to remove illegal 
content as well as identical and equivalent content with worldwide effect.
B. The Judgment
The ECJ handed down its ruling on October 3, 2019. It began its analy-
sis with a series of observations about the ECD, highlighting that Facebook 
Ireland offered hosting services privileged by art. 14 ECD.
11
The immunity 
they enjoy according to this article does not, in the light of art. 14(3) ECD 
and recital 45 ECD, preclude that national courts direct injunctions against 
the provider to take down illegal content, even if the provider cannot be 
made liable for the content.
12
Member states must ensure corresponding 
mechanisms for plaintiffs before their courts, for which they enjoy a particu-
larly wide discretion under art. 18(1) ECD.
13
In light of the broad wording 
of art. 18(1) ECD, the ECJ also considered the range of national measures to 
be demanded by national courts in their injunctions against the ISPs to be 
broad as well.
14
The ECJ ended these preliminary remarks with a nod to art. 
9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
267, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
10. See MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 223–29 (2d ed. 2014).
11. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 22–23.
12. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
13. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28–29.
14. Id. ¶ 30.
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15 ECD and its prohibition on general monitoring obligations as a limit of 
the member state’s injunctive power.
15
The ECJ first found that ordering an ISP to remove or block access to 
information stored by the ISP that is “identical” to the content of infor-
mation previously declared to be illegal was not a prohibited general moni-
toring obligation,
16
but a specific monitoring obligation.
17
According to the 
ECJ it is “legitimate” that such injunctions are issued, regardless of who up-
loaded the illegal information,
18
in the light of how easily such content can 
be shared and disseminated on a social network.
19
Finally, the ECJ reiterated 
that because the content at issue is identical to content previously declared 
to be illegal, the obligation was not a general obligation to monitor.
20
After dealing with identical content, the ECJ turned to the question of 
whether art. 15 ECD allows for an injunction ordering the removal of con-
tent that is “equivalent” to the illegal content. The ECJ understood equiva-
lent information to be content “which remains essentially unchanged and 
therefore diverges very little from the content which gave rise to the finding 
of illegality.”
21
By reference to recital 41 ECD, the ECJ considered whether 
the obligation to remove equivalent content properly strikes a balance be-
tween the interests of the ISP and the interests of the defamed person.
22
In 
the ECJ’s view, removal orders for equivalent content do not excessively 
burden ISPs for three reasons: (1) the injunction sets out the factors that 
qualify content as “equivalent,” (2) equivalent content is only content that 
can be identified without an independent assessment, which (3) allows the 
ISP to use “automated search tools and technologies.”
23
Finally, the ECJ turned to the question whether the ECD prohibits in-
junctions that require the global takedown of content. By reference to the 
general lack of limits imposed on the member states by the ECD other than 
in art. 15 ECD, the ECJ held that the ECD did not contain a territorial limit 
for such injunctions.
24
Pointing to recitals 58 and 60 of the ECD, the ECJ 
stated only that applicable rules of international law had to be respected.
25
15. Id. ¶ 31.
16. Id. ¶ 37.
17. Id. ¶ 35.
18. Id. ¶ 37.
19. Id. ¶ 36.
20. Id. ¶ 37.
21. Id. ¶ 39.
22. Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
23. Id. ¶ 46.
24. Id. ¶¶ 48–50.
25. Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
174 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:167
II. A Brief Overview of the Relevant EU Internet Law
To give a full account of the EU’s Internet regulation and policy would 
go beyond the limits of this note.
26
Rather, this section only tries to intro-
duce the key institutional and legal settings in which EU Internet regulation 
operates.
A. The Market and the Individual
EU regulation of the Internet
27
is, broadly speaking, driven by two main 
concerns: the regulation of the Digital Single Market
28
and the protection of 
the individual in the digital era.
29
First, the Internet has enormous economic 
consequences for the European Single Market. Internet regulation quickly 
became a necessity to ensure the survival of the Single Market.
30
Many ex-
isting regulatory areas such as IP law became part of EU Internet regulation 
because of the change the regulated area underwent as part of economic dig-
italization. Second, the EU also began to tackle the impact of the Internet on 
private individuals by enacting consumer and data protection laws.
The enumerated powers of the EU contribute to the EU’s focus on these 
two broad categories of Internet regulation. The EU does not possess gen-
eral police powers. Market related Internet regulation is usually based on 
art. 114 TFEU, the competence to regulate the Single Market. The ECJ had 
ruled, as early as 2000 in the famous Tobacco Advertising31 case that this 
was not a general power but required a genuine goal related to the Single 
Market.
32
Prominent legislative action by the EU in this area encompasses 
different directives and regulations on electronic commerce.
33
26. See ANDREJ SAVIN, EU INTERNET LAW 21–29 (2d ed. 2017) for further details.
27. This paper only includes a discussion of the regulation concerning Internet provid-
ers and Internet content. EU law also significantly regulates the physical aspect of the Internet. 
See PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW 171–390 
(2d ed. 2011).
28. The European Single Market is a common market of the 27 EU member states, the 
EEA states (Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland), Switzerland, and, pending a resolution of 
the Brexit process, the United Kingdom. It in essence guarantees the free movement of capi-
tal, goods, services, labor, and persons. As a reaction to the digitalization of society and the 
economy, the European Commission under then President Jean-Claude Juncker announced its 
“Digital Single Market” policy bundle in 2015. The European Commission under its current 
President Ursula von der Leyen has been pursuing a “European Digital Strategy,” expanding 
on the policy goals of the previous Commission since 2019. European Commission, Shaping 
Europe’s Digital Future, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/.
29. See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 2–5.
30. Twenty-eight of the Commission’s 30 proposals as part of the “Digital Single Mar-
ket” policy were taken up by the EU’s legislature from 2015 to 2019. European Commission, 
A Digital Single Market for the Benefit of All Europeans (Nov. 2019), https://ec.europa.eu
/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=53056.
31. Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419.
32. Id. ¶¶ 83–84. This case can be read as an equivalent to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 
Fall 2020] Regulation of Online Speech 175
Regulation concerned with the protection of the individual as a partici-
pant in the digital market is based on more specific powers. Notably, regula-
tion around Consumer Protection
34
and Data Protection Regimes
35
are usual-
ly based on art. 169 TFEU and art. 16 TFEU respectively.
Speech-related issues have not been a prominent part of EU Internet 
regulation, falling in neither of the two broad fields of EU Internet regula-
tion. Few existing EU legislative acts encounter questions of speech and 
most of those only peripherally. For example, EU law extensively covers 
issues of jurisdiction and choice of law under the recast Brussels I Regula-
tion
36
and the Rome II Regulation applicable to torts.
37
They may apply to 
cases in which speech-related torts are at issue. But because these rules deal 
with procedural aspects, they rarely, if at all, reach into the speech-related 
issues under the applicable national law.
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). However, this does 
not exclude broad regulatory powers. For example, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (Data Retention Directive) passed on March 15, 2006, but later 
invalidated by the ECJ as a violation of the CFR in Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digi-
tal Rights Ireland v. Minister for Comms., Marine & Nat. Resources, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 
(Apr. 8, 2014), based data retention legislation on the power to regulate the Single Market, 
which was approved by the ECJ in Case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council, 2009 
E.C.R. I-593. See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 20.
33. See, e.g., ECD, supra note 5; Directive 2006/123, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36;
Directive 2009/110, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
the Taking up, Pursuit and Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Insti-
tutions, 2009 O.J. (L 267) 7–17; Regulation 910/2014, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Trans-
actions in the Internal market, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73.
34. See, e.g., Directive 2011/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive 
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with 
EEA Relevance, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64; Directive 2013/11 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and 
Amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on Consumer 
ADR), 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63; Regulation 524/2013, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), 
2013 O.J. (L 165) 1.
35. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
36. Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 De-
cember 2012 in Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1.
37. Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40–
49.
176 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:167
One of the few modern instances of direct EU speech regulation is art. 
17 GDPR, which enshrines the so-called “Right to be Forgotten,” based on 
an earlier decision by the ECJ.
38
Somewhere in between these two extremes 
lies the ECD. It does not directly regulate online speech. Rather, it sets up a 
comprehensive framework for electronic commerce, and is thus a corner-
stone of the establishment of the Digital Single Market.
39
The ECD also 
deals with liabilities and immunities of ISPs and the actions that can be tak-
en against them. These actions, in turn, have an impact on online content.
B. In Particular: The E-Commerce Directive 2000/31
According to its art. 1(1), the ECD seeks to enhance the internal market 
by guaranteeing the free movement of “information society services.” It fo-
cusses on the freedom of establishment of information society services (arts. 
4 and 5 ECD), the rules for commercial communication (arts. 6–8 ECD), 
electronic contracts (arts. 9–11 ECD), and the liabilities of service providers 
(arts. 12–15 ECD), supplemented by rules for transposing and enforcing the 
directive (arts. 16–20 ECD).
40
In arts. 12–14, the ECD provides for three instances in which ISPs are 
not liable for illegal content their service encounters: specifically, when they 
are caching, conduiting, and hosting content. Each article conditions this 
immunity in certain ways, for example, immunity for content stored at the 
request of a user under art. 14(1) is only available if:
“(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity 
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or infor-
mation is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information.”
However, these immunities explicitly do not shield the ISPs from in-
junctions requiring ISPs to terminate or prevent infringements, as arts. 
12(3), 13(2), and 14(3) ECD state. Art. 14(3) ECD further allows member 
states to establish procedures governing the removal of illegal content by 
the ISP. This means that the ISPs enjoy, under certain conditions, immunity 
from liability for the illegal content on their service but are not exempted 
from being obligated under national law to remove content identified as il-
legal. This stands in contrast to the broad immunity enjoyed by ISPs under 
47 U.S.C. § 230, which grants them immunity from any cause of action 
38. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 34 (May 13, 2014).
39. See ECD, supra note 5, recitals 1–4, art. 1(1).
40. UTE WELLBROCK, EIN KOHÄRENTER RECHTSRAHMEN FÜR DEN ELEKTRONISCHEN 
GESCHÄFTSVERKEHR IN EUROPA 30-37 (2005).
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treating them as a “publisher” or “speaker” of the content on their service.
41
As a limitation to the obligations of ISPs, art. 15 ECD makes clear that there 
is no general obligation for ISPs to monitor content.
While these provisions can easily come into play in a case regarding 
online content regulation, they are strictly ancillary to the illegality of con-
tent. The ECD itself does not at all define or regulate what illegal content is. 
Under the relevant section, the ECD is only concerned with liabilities and 
obligations for ISPs arising from illegal content.
III. Making Sense of GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK
A. A Focus on the Protection of Interests Harmed by Illegal Content
The ECJ had previously established that arts. 12–15 ECD are protec-
tions for ISPs designed to recognize their special role as intermediaries.
42
While art. 15 ECD prohibits general obligations to monitor, recital 45 ECD 
allows monitoring obligations “in a specific case.” Thus, the difficulty is to 
determine what kind of monitoring obligations are specific and what kind of 
obligations are general in nature.
1. Uncertainties Surrounding art. 15 ECD Before Glawischnig-Piesczek
In two previous cases, Scarlett Extended and SABAM, the ECJ had the 
opportunity to address whether a filtering regime imposed by national law 
was a prohibited general obligation to monitor.
43
In these cases, three char-
acteristics of the filtering regimes at issue made them problematic for the 
ECJ under art. 15 ECD: (1) active observation of (2) all files stored or all 
communication transmitted, resulting in (3) an observation of all or almost 
all of the information transmitted or stored by all users of the service.
44
The 
ECJ declined to formulate a general test in this regard, but concluded that 
the combination of these three factors went too far.
41. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–50 (D.D.C. 1998). More recent examples include Jones v. Dirty 
World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2016); O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 
831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019); Mar-
shall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1269–71 (D.C. Cir. 2019); 
Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 405, 408–11 (2019). For a constructive approach to the future of Sec. 230, see Andrew 
O. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act at 20, 42 
RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 11–17 (2016).
42. Joined Cases C-236 to 238/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 
E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 107; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 107.
43. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶¶ 37–40; 
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 36–38 (Feb. 16, 2012).
44. Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶ 39; SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶ 
37.
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Complementary to these three cumulative factors, arts. 14 and 15 ECD 
read in conjunction seem to provide the outer limit of what kind of obliga-
tion to monitor could still be tolerable under art 15 ECD. As Advocate Gen-
eral (AG) Szpunar argues, a broad interpretation of permissible obligations 
under art. 15 ECD may carry the risk that ISPs no longer qualify for immun-
ities under art. 14(1) ECD.
45
The broader the monitoring obligation, the 
more likely it is for ISPs to have sufficient “actual knowledge” of illegal ac-
tivity, which would strip them of their immunity under art. 14(1)(a) unless 
they immediately act to remove the content under 14(2)(b). Art. 14(3) ECD 
allows national authorities, notwithstanding the immunities of art. 14(1) 
ECD, to require ISPs to terminate or prevent infringements or to establish 
procedures governing the removal of content, thus presupposing the exist-
ence of the immunity. When read in conjunction, art. 15(1) ECD and art. 
14(3) ECD do not seem to permit measures that would strip ISPs of their 
immunities under art. 14(1) ECD. Thus, the outer limit of general monitor-
ing obligations seems to be that injunctions may not force ISPs to lose their 
immunity under arts. 14(1)(a) or (b) ECD.
46
The ECJ has not yet developed a definition of what constitutes a specif-
ic obligation. But even before Glawischnig-Piesczek, there were some hints 





clearly allow Member States to impose obligations on ISPs for the 
future, which means that a monitoring obligation does not automatically be-
come general in nature just because it is directed into the future.
49
Further, in 
a trademark case under the Intellectual Property Directive
50
(L’Oréal v. 
eBay51), the ECJ found permissible an obligation to prevent further “in-
fringements of that kind” committed by the same seller with regard to the 
same trademarks.
52
The limits of this concept remain rather imprecise, but it 
seems like the ECJ is sympathetic to actions against further infringements 
that share all characteristics of the initial infringement. AG Szpunar argued 
45. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 36–38 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
46. Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
47. ECD, supra note 5, art. 14(3) (“This Article shall not affect the possibility for a 
court or administrative authority . . . of requiring the service provider to . . . prevent an in-
fringement.”).
48. Id. art. 18 (“Member States shall ensure that court actions available under national 
law . . . allow for the rapid adoption of measures . . . designed to . . . prevent any further im-
pairment of the interests involved.”).
49. ELONORA ROSATI, COPYRIGHT AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 158 (2019).
50. See generally Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45.
51. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 139 (July 12, 
2011).
52. Id. ¶ 141.
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that this judgment was of a “cross-cutting nature”
53
so that a monitoring ob-
ligation is specific if it extends to the same kind of infringement of the same 
rights by the same user as originally at issue.
54
Another suggested benchmark for what constitutes a specific monitor-
ing obligation is its limited duration.
55
This idea originated from the opinion 
of AG Jääskinen in the L’Oréal case, where a time limitation was used to 
ensure proportionality of the injunction in question.
56
However, this is un-
convincing. While proportionality of a monitoring obligation is important as 
a general principle of EU law,
57
it is not at all obvious that time limitations 
are able to make a monitoring obligation specific, because the distinction 
between general and specific obligations depends more on a substantive as-
sessment than on a temporal limitation. A time limitation alone does little to 
make obligations more specific and less general, but merely suspends the 
obligation after a certain time.
In sum, significant uncertainty surrounded art. 15 ECD and its notions 
of general and specific obligations to monitor. It was unclear whether it 
mattered that the content was defamatory and therefore illegal and not a 
trademark or copyright law violation. In this situation, the ECJ opted for a 
strong protection of the interests harmed by defamatory content, a general 
orientation that influenced many key findings of the judgment.
2. Specific Monitoring Obligations—A Broad but Controllable Notion
As AG Szpunar observed,
58
the obligation to remove content identical 
or equivalent to illegal content means that all user content on the platform is 
subject to monitoring. Contrary to one possible reading of Scarlett Extended
and SABAM, the ECJ did not treat the scope of the data to be monitored as 
decisive in determining whether a monitoring obligation is specific or gen-
eral. Instead, the ECJ in Glawischnig-Piesczek found that a monitoring obli-
gation is still specific if the monitoring of all content is focused on specific 
illegal content that has been defined by a court and its different reincarna-
53. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 43 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
54. See id. ¶¶ 42–45; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 
139, 141, 144.
55. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 47, 49 (Opinion of Advocate 
General Szpunar); Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Ent. Ger. GmbH, 
EULI:EU:C:2016:170, ¶ 132 (Mar. 16, 2016) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
56. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6019, ¶ 181 (Opinion 
of Advocate General Jääskinen).
57. Proportionality is accepted as a general principle of EU law since the founding 
days. See Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonnière v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal and Steel Cmty., 
1956 E.C.R. 293, 299; see generally NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW 115–70 (1996).
58. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 59 (Opinion of Advocate General 
Szpunar).
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tions on the service. It is thus the scope of the material inquiry that defines 
whether a monitoring obligation is general or specific. A broad obligation to 
monitor all content for any illegality is general but monitoring all content 
for particular instances of illegal content is specific. This clearly resembles 
the holding in L’Oréal59 and confirms the idea that once illegal content is 
identified and defined by a Court, the ISP can be asked to remove, or block 
content tainted by this kind of illegality.
It may seem counterintuitive to call a monitoring obligation of all con-
tent stored on a platform “specific;” however, such an obligation is targeted 
and specifically limited to the grounds for illegality at issue.
60
To prohibit 
this as a general obligation would render the protection of the rights of the 
defamed completely futile beyond the case in which the illegality of the 
content was established. It is this focus on the effective protection of the in-
terest harmed by defamatory content that runs through the entire judgment.
Importantly, this kind of specific monitoring obligation does not strip 
the ISP of its immunity under art. 14(1) ECD, thus clearly respecting the 
outer limits of specific monitoring obligations.
61
To focus on one particular 
kind of content when sifting through the traffic can hardly lead to sufficient 
knowledge of illegal content to qualify for the loss of immunity because of 
“actual knowledge of illegal activity or information” under art. 14(1)(a) 
ECD. The use of “automated search tools and technologies”
62
also does not 
impact the immunities granted by the ECD.
63
3. Recognizing the Dangers of Social Networks
Another important aspect of the ECJ’s focus on the protection of the in-
terests harmed by the illegal content is the reliance on the specific nature of 
social networks and their dangers for personality rights.
64
For the ECJ, the 
nature of social networks and the risk of swift reproduction of illegal con-
tent justifies particular vigilance for the interests of the defamed user. This 
59. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 141 (“[I]f the op-
erator of the online marketplace does not decide . . . to prevent further infringements of that 
kind by the same seller in respect of the same trademarks, it may be ordered, by means of 
an injunction, to do so.”) (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 41, 45.
61. See Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net: Internet Content Filters and the Advocate 
General’s Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Opinion, STANFORD CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 4, 2019), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/Dolphins-in-the-Net-
AG-Analysis.pdf.
62. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 46.
63. See Joined Cases C-236 to 238/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 
2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 114–117 (holding that the use of algorithms to organize and display 
content did not impact immunity under art. 14 ECD).
64. See Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 36.
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seems to be the reason why the ECJ allows the monitoring obligation irre-
spective of who uploaded the identical content.
65
In so allowing, the ECJ departs from the requirement in L’Oréal that 
the future infringements to be prevented must not only be tainted by the 
same illegality in respect of the same trademarks, but must also stem from 
the same infringer.
66
Indeed, such a limiting factor would clearly ignore how 
social networks function and would overlook the specific dangers that the 
dissemination of illegal speech on these network poses for the rights of the 
person targeted by that speech. In defamation cases on social networks, this 
specific vigilance is the consequence of an approach focused on protection 
of the rights of the person damaged by the illegal content.
4. Defining Identical and Equivalent Content
The ECJ extends the possible reach of injunctions against ISPs to con-
tent that is identical or equivalent to the content originally found to be ille-
gal. The ECJ did not attempt to define what “identical content” means. It 
did, however, provide a definition of “equivalent content” as “information 
conveying a message the content of which remains essentially unchanged 
and therefore diverges very little from the content which gave rise to the 
finding of illegality.”
67
It is crucial to understand that the rights of the defamed are not endan-
gered by exact phrases. As the ECJ correctly points out, it is the defamatory 
message conveyed that makes the statement at issue illegal.
68
Accordingly, 
it should be evident, as the ECJ points out, that the removal of equivalent 
content is the best way to ensure effective termination of infringements and 
further damages to the rights of the defamed.
69
Concerns were raised against the obligation to take down identical con-
tent, as that would likely mean a prohibition of the text ruled to be defama-
tory, resulting in the removal of these phrases even when they are not ille-
gal.
70
The ECJ has also been criticized for not providing a sufficiently clear 
definition of equivalent content.
71
This is a valid criticism: the conceivable 
appearances of a message with essentially unchanged content are numerous, 
as are the contexts in which phrases can appear. How much can change for 
the message to be “essentially unchanged”? Commentators have indicated 
65. See id. ¶ 37.
66. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 141.
67. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 39.
68. Id. ¶ 40.
69. Id. ¶ 41.
70. Keller, supra note 61, at 20.
71. Jennifer Daskal, Speech Across Borders, 105 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1625 (2019); Mat-
thias C. Kettemann & Anna S. Tiedeke, Welche Regeln, welches Recht?: Glawischnig-
Piesczek und die Gefahren nationaler Jurisdiktionskonflikte im Internet, VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/welche-regeln-welches-recht.
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that this poses many unsolvable questions for the ISPs, making the imple-
mentation of the judgment “close to impossible.”
72
A fair reading of the judgment, however, suggests that the treatment of 
identical or equivalent content is not nearly as murky or burdensome on 
ISPs as some might fear. The ECJ clearly is concerned with stopping the in-
fringement of rights and the further impairment of the protected interests.
73
The injunctions the ECJ permitted here are designed to stop some identified 
illegality and its harms to the person concerned but do not go beyond this 
goal.
This reading is why an obligation to take down “identical” content—as 
long as it is truly that—should not be problematic, even for other users who 
might want to use these phrases in other contexts.
74
The ECJ allows national 
courts to stop the same harm caused by the same means. Content is only 
identical, and possibly the subject of an injunction, if it is not only an exact 
reproduction of that content, but if it also produces the identical infringe-
ment of rights. Using the problematic phrases in jest, in news coverage, or 
in academic writing
75
is not “identical content.”
The determination of what content is “equivalent” similarly must hinge 
on whether the content is illegal in the same way as the original content 
was. Because it is the illegality that must be stopped, any kind of statement 
that is tainted by the same features that made the original statement illegal 
must be considered “equivalent.” Once a national court establishes what 
makes the content at issue illegal, these considerations are the blueprint for 
the determination of what may count as equivalent content.
This determination requires significant work for the national courts that 
issue such injunctions. It is their job to clearly articulate what made the con-
tent at issue an illegal defamation. Insufficiencies in that regard may indeed 
pose practical problems for ISPs. However, the ECJ is aware of that prob-
lem and indicates that the injunctions must contain the information that 
turns content into equivalent content. The ECJ specifically asks national 
courts to include in their injunctions “the name of the person concerned by 
the infringement . . ., the circumstances in which that infringement was de-
termined and equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal.”
76
It is thus primarily up to the national court issuing the injunction to de-
fine what qualifies as equivalent. The ISPs could benefit from this. Whatev-
er content is not specifically identified as “equivalent content” in the injunc-
tion does not have to be treated as such. If national courts fail to adequately 
indicate what content they had in mind, ISPs could point to the ECJ’s re-
72. Daskal, supra note 71, at 1625.
73. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 41 (Oct. 3, 2019).
74. But cf. Keller, supra note 61, at 19.
75. Id. at 19–20.
76. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 45.
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quirement for clarifications to avoid having to deal with equivalent con-
tent.
77
This responsibility of the national courts is not accidental. The ECD 
hands over all responsibility for injunctions under art. 14(3) ECD to the na-
tional courts. And under art. 18(1) ECD, it is the member state’s obligation 
to create effective remedies in their own courts to combat infringements.
Even if national courts did not live up to their responsibilities and ISPs 
still wanted to comply, the ISPs would only have to refer to the reasons the 
national court gave for why it found the original content to be illegal. As 
soon as ISPs encounter any doubts in applying these standards, the content 
under review automatically does not qualify as equivalent, because the 
“[d]ifferences in the wording of that equivalent content . . . must not . . . be 
such as to require the host provider concerned to carry out an independent 
assessment of that content.”
78
The ISPs will thus always have the benefit of 
the doubt.
5. A Lopsided Protection of Interests?
The ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD may seem lopsided and unduly 
focused on the interests harmed by illegal content without sufficient regard 
for the interests of the users posting content and the interests of the ISP. 
Leaving aside for the moment considerations based on fundamental rights 
(see infra, C.III.), the ECJ’s judgment follows convincingly from the basic 
legislative choices made in passing the ECD and offers a plausible and con-
vincing reading of the ECD.
First, the only content the ECD is concerned with is illegal content. 
Arts. 12–14 ECD deal with the immunities and obligations of ISPs in con-
frontation with illegal content and art. 15 ECD complements and limits 
these obligations of ISPs. The ECD does not define the illegality but is 
merely triggered by content found to be illegal under EU or national law 
with due regard to the applicable fundamental rights guarantees. But what-
ever content has triggered the application of the ECD, is unprotected 
speech. The interests of the speakers of this unprotected speech therefore do 
not warrant any protection under the ECD. In the case at hand, the illegality 
of the content at issue in the case had already been affirmatively established 
by the Austrian Supreme Court under Austrian law and it was for the ECJ 
only to decide on the interpretation of the ECD as triggered by this illegali-
ty.
77. This construction allows the ECJ to bypass the problem of accountability for plat-
forms if they must decide for themselves what kind of speech to censor. Kate Klonick, The
New Governors: The People, Rules and Processes in Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1598, 1662-68 (2018).
78. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 45.
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Second, the ECJ balances the interests of ISPs with the interests harmed 
by the content.
79
The ECJ, in application of recital 41 ECD, achieves this, as 
argued above, by handing over most of the responsibilities to the national 
courts and requires them to come up with detailed instructions for the ISPs. 
The possibility to rely on automated search tools is also considered as a fac-
tor that limits the burden on ISPs. Even if one may not agree with the result, 
the interests of ISPs surely are considered by the ECJ.
Third, the ECD on its own terms shows special solicitude for the inter-
ests harmed by illegal content. Art. 18(1) puts member states under an obli-
gation to “ensure that court actions available under national law concerning 
information society services’ activities allow for the rapid adoption of 
measures, including interim measures, designed to terminate any alleged in-
fringement and to prevent any further impairment of the interests involved.”
(emphasis added).
With this article, the legislature indicated a very protective attitude to-
wards the victims of infringements. The ECJ chose to interpret the limits the 
ECD may place on injunctions with due regard to the ECD’s clear impera-
tive to effectively protect the interests harmed. The ECJ thus took seriously 
the legislative decision to allow national courts to effectively protect the in-
terests harmed by illegal content. Any other general orientation would have 
seriously misrepresented art. 18(1) ECD and would have turned the clearly 
expressed legislative intentions upside down.
The ECJ’s focus, therefore, does not lose sight of important aspects, but 
faithfully sticks to the ECD and the legislative decision to effectively pro-
tect against infringements through injunctions issued by national courts. If 
that seems lopsided, it is mostly because the legislature conceived the ECD 
the way it is now enforced by the ECJ.
B. The Problem of Automated Monitoring
One of the most discussed aspects of the judgment was that it apparent-
ly opened the door to upload filters that many object to on fundamental 
rights grounds.
80
On one reading of the judgment, some of the ECJ’s cryptic 
79. See id. ¶¶ 43–47.
80. CJEU Ruling on Fighting Defamation Online Could Open the Door for Upload 
Filters, EDRI (Oct. 3, 2019), https://edri.org/our-work/cjeu-ruling-on-fighting-defamation-
online-could-open-the-door-for-upload-filters/#:~:text=a%20defamatory%20comment.-
,Some%20aspects%20of%20the%20decision%20could%20pose%20a%20threat%20for,filters
%20for%20all%20online%20content.; Eleftherios Chelioudakis, The Glawischnig-Piesczek v. 
Facebook Case: Knock, Knock. Who’s There? Automated Filters Online, KU LEUVEN CITIP
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/the-glawischnig-piesczek-v-
facebook-case-knock-knock-whos-there-automated-filters-online.
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remarks could be understood as requiring the use of filters and excluding 
human involvement to correct the mistakes filters make.
81
The use of automated filters to combat illegal content has been fiercely 
debated, most recently in the context of the new Copyright Directive.
82
Us-
ing filters as a means to counter hate speech is especially controversial be-
cause it is very doubtful, to say the least, whether filters will ever be able to 
comprehend the subtleties in context that may differentiate defamation from 
satire or the innocent use of a phrase from a use of that phrase that could be 
hate speech.
83
The legally mandated use of a technology that apparently 
produces many false positives by blocking legal speech poses fundamental 
rights problems. There is an abundance of instances in which the use of fil-





However, a close reading of the case reveals that the ECJ’s remarks in 
this regard are far less problematic than they may seem. Specifically, the 
ECJ did not endorse or demand the use of filters uncontrolled by human 
oversight.
The impression that the ECJ endorsed automated filter technologies 
rests on two remarks in the judgment. First, the ECJ makes clear that the 
ISPs cannot be ordered to undertake an independent assessment of the legal-
ity of the content. Second, the ECJ mentions automated search tools and 
technologies to which the ISPs may have recourse.
86
To begin with, the ECJ does not simply state that ISPs may not under-
take an assessment of a content’s illegality on their own. Rather, the ECJ 
delimits its notion of “equivalent content” by introducing the idea that any 
81. This reading is advanced by some of the most vocal critics of the judgment. See, 
e.g., Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s Glawischnig-
Piesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR INT’L 616, 620–22 (2020).
82. Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. For a critique, see Andrej Savin, Regulating 
Internet Platforms in the EU – The Emergence of the ‘Level Playing Field’, 34 COMPUT. L. &
SEC. REV. 1215, 1225 (2018).
83. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 71, at 1625; Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: 
How Platform Censorship Has Failed So Far and How to Ensure that the Response to Neo-
Nazis Doesn’t Make It Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 432, 437–50 (2008).
84. Amber Ferguson, Proud Mom Orders ‘Summa Cum Laude’ Cake Online. Publix 
Censors It: Summa . . . Laude., WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/05/22/proud-mom-orders-
summa-cum-laude-cake-online-publix-censors-it-to-summa-laude.
85. Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White Man Called Her Kids the N-Word. Face-




86. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 45–46 (Oct. 3, 2019).
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content that would require an independent assessment by the ISP does not 
constitute equivalent content. Content that requires an autonomous decision 
on its illegality by the ISP beyond the mechanical application of the national 
court’s judgment, is not included in the ECJ’s notion of “equivalent con-
tent.”
87
This is important because the prohibition of an independent assess-
ment of content does not per se exclude human involvement in the review 
process. Rather, it is a limiting factor in what the national court can ask the 
ISP to deal with in an injunction. Specifically, the national court cannot ask 
the ISP to look at content and force it to make up its own mind regarding 
this content’s illegality. All the ISP can be asked to do is to mechanically 
apply the clear parameters set out by the national court in the injunction.
Because of this limit of the ISP’s obligations, the ECJ points out that 
they can more easily use “automated search tools and technologies” to com-
ply with injunctions. For the ECJ, the possibility to use such technologies is 
a factor in the balancing of the interests involved.
88
The combination of a 
narrow conception of “equivalent content” and the rising possibility of not 
having to rely exclusively on human judgment to detect such content
89
leads 
the ECJ to conclude that such obligations are not an exceeding burden on 
the ISPs. The ECJ focusses extensively on the narrow scope of the removal 
obligation, which signals that a broader obligation that would have required 
ISPs to make up their own minds as to the illegality of related content would 
have been excessive. But the obligation is narrower. It explicitly excludes 
autonomous judgment calls and facilitates the use of technologies in assist-
ing the ISPs. The use of filters does not seem to be a requirement or necessi-
ty. The ECJ merely explains why in a situation where ISPs can resort to 
technologies to aid in their tasks, this task is not burdensome enough con-
sidering the other interests involved to not allow for such an obligation.
Therefore, nothing in the judgment requires the use of broadly sweep-
ing filters that cannot be corrected by human involvement. Nothing in the 
judgment even indicates that the use of humans to monitor and correct the 
work of filters would be problematic or an undue burden. This is because 
the finding that the burden on the ISP is not too heavy rests on the fact that 
ISPs do not have to make up their own minds as regards the illegality of 
content—they can only be asked to mechanically apply the factors a nation-
al court identifies in an injunction. Because of that, the task may be facili-
tated by technologies.
It is true that the ECJ does not require human intervention to fix the 
mistakes automated filters could make. ISPs may, as a result, choose to use 
only filters to comply with such injunctions, preferring cheaper, blunt action 
instead of fine-tuned precision. However, it is not the ECJ’s responsibility 
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶¶ 43, 46.
89. Id. ¶ 46.
Fall 2020] Regulation of Online Speech 187
to tailor to the needs of ISPs. Courts enforcing a law that aims to protect the 
interests harmed by illegal content should not need to weaken the protection 
of these interests just because those to which the law assigns the responsibil-
ity to prevent future harms might decide to use improper tools in their own 
economic interest. The ECJ’s limited concept of equivalent content that 
ISPs can be asked to take down with its significant burden on national 
courts to define this content should aid the ISPs in not having to resort to 
broadly sweeping filters.
C. The Curious Absence of Fundamental Rights
Even though the ECJ’s approach has been very protective of the 
interests harmed by defamatory speech, more fundamental rights interests 
are involved. One of the most prominent critiques of the judgment was that 
it did not sufficiently deal with the fundamental rights issues raised by the 
case.
90
Indeed, the case raises many urgent fundamental rights questions, 
perhaps most pressingly the question of what kind of speech online can be 
banned and how the obligations of service providers to monitor and remove 
content affects fundamental rights of both the ISP and the users. It is true 
that the ECJ does not consider these points in the judgment and merely 
alludes to the necessity to ensure a balance between the burdens placed on a 
service provider and the person who was the subject of the defamatory 
content.
91
Neither the CFR, nor national fundamental rights, nor the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
92
are even mentioned in 
the judgment.
Is the ECJ willfully ignoring obvious fundamental rights problems or 
was there simply no majority within the ECJ for any view on these issues? 
A thorough analysis of the case, the principles guiding the applicability of 
the CFR, and the complicated interplay of fundamental rights guaranteed by 
national law, EU law and the ECHR suggests a more balanced view. While 
the ECJ’s silence on these matters may be highly frustrating from an aca-
demic point of view, there are good reasons why the ECJ did not engage in 
such an analysis. The case simply did not trigger the CFR’s guarantees of 
free speech and freedom of information. Instead, these questions, for now, 
must be handled under national fundamental rights guarantees and the 
ECHR. Only the freedom to conduct a business under art. 16 CFR may have 
a role to play here.
90. See, e.g., Kettemann & Tiedeke, supra note 71.
91. See Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 43, 46.
92. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter ECHR].
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1. Fundamental Rights Interests Involved
There are multiple fundamental rights interests involved in this case 
which are, in abstracto, all recognized by the CFR. Art. 11 CFR protects the 
freedom of expression of the user who posted the initial content, the user 
who posts identical and equivalent content, and other users to receive in-
formation. This right is subject to the limit of a proportionate restriction for 
the protection of the reputation and rights of others.
93
The removal order 
may also implicate Facebook Ireland’s rights to conduct a business under 
art. 16 CFR. For the following reasons, however, most of these Charter 
rights were not applicable to the case and the ECJ was correct in not impli-
cating them in its analysis.
2. Standard for the Applicability of the CFR
Art. 51(1) CFR governs the applicability of the CFR. It reads:
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bod-
ies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law.
While there is significant debate and still much uncertainty surrounding 
this provision,
94
the caselaw of the ECJ allows one to formulate some gen-
eral tests to determine the Charter’s applicability, workable enough to de-
termine whether the CFR should have played a role in the case at hand.
a. Applicability of the Charter in “The Scope of EU Law”
The wording of art. 51(1) CFR was inspired by certain parts of the 
ECJ’s pre-Charter caselaw
95
which concerned situations in which EU law 
required a member state to act.
96
In other pre-Charter cases, in which Mem-
93. This limit is expressly recognized in art. 10(2) ECHR, which applies by virtue of 
art. 52(3) CFR to the interferences with fundamental rights that the Charter allows under art. 
52(1) CFR.
94. For an overview of the many uncertainties surrounding this provision, see Filippo 
Fontanelli, The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States Under Art. 51 (1) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 193, 234–43 (2014); Daniel 
Sarmiento, Who’s Afraid of the Charter: The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New 
Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1267, 
1272–87 (2013).
95. Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, ¶ 19; Case C-
2/92, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte Bostock, 1994 E.C.R. I-
955, ¶ 16; Case C-292/97, Karlsson, 2000 E.C.R. I-2737, ¶ 27.
96. These situations also encompass situations in which member states enjoy a discre-
tionary power, which has to be exercised in accordance with other EU law provisions. See, 
e.g., Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13905, ¶ 65.
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ber States had derogated from EU law or in which EU fundamental rights 
were found to be inapplicable, the ECJ stated that Member States are bound 





finally adopted by the Charter was taken out 
of its context as a formulation to describe one category of EU fundamental 
rights application prior to the elaboration of a written catalogue of funda-
mental rights in the EU.
99
The official explanations relating to the Charter,
100
which serve as a basis for the CFR’s interpretation,
101
openly contradicted a 
limited understanding of the CFR’s applicability by asserting that Member 
States are bound by the CFR when “they act in the scope of [EU] law.”
Considering these developments, the ECJ in the case of Åkerberg 
Fransson102 did not accept a role for the Charter that was limited to situa-
tions in which member states acted according to obligations imposed by EU 
law. The ECJ held that “the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter 
must . . . be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope 
of European Union law.”
103
This meant that “situations cannot exist which 
are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental 
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails ap-
plicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”
104
Given 
the CFR’s history, such a broad interpretation of art. 51 CFR could hardly 
have come as a surprise.
105
97. See Case C-260/89, Etairia v. Pliroforissis, 1991 E.C.R. I-2925, ¶ 42; Case C-
299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 1997 E.C.R. I-2629, ¶¶ 15–17; Case C-309/96, An-
nibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia, 1997 E.C.R. I-7493, ¶¶ 10, 14.
98. See GUY BRAIBANT, LA CHARTE DES DROIT FONDAMENTAUX DE L’UNION 
EUROPEENNE: TEMOIGNAGE ET COMMENTAIRES 251 (2001); Peter Goldsmith, A Charter of 
Rights, Freedoms, and Principles, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 1201, 1204-05 (2001).
99. Fabrice Picod, Art. 51 – Champ d’Application, in CHARTE DES DROITS 
FONDAMENTAUX DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE ¶ 22 (Fa-
brice Picod & Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck eds., 2017).
100. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. (C 303) 17.
101. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
6, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 (“The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter 
shall be interpreted . . . with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set 
out the sources of those provisions.”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
art. 52(7), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 (“The explanations drawn up as a way of 
providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts 
of the Union and of the Member States.”); see also Case C-279/09, Deutsche Energiehandels-
und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. I-13849, ¶ 32.
102. Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 (Feb. 26, 2013).
103. Id. ¶ 21.
104. Id.
105. Bernhard Schima, EU Fundamental Rights and Member State Action After Lisbon: 
Putting the ECJ’s Case Law in Its Context, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1097, 1107 (2015). Such 
an understanding had already clearly been on the rise by that time. See, e.g., Piet Eeckhout, 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
945, 993 (2002); Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the Charter: 
Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
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The ECJ thus established the formula of the “scope of EU law” as the 
governing approach to the interpretation of art. 51 CFR.
 
Apart from some 
hints,
106
 the ECJ, however, did not set a standard for the determination of the 
“scope of EU law.”
107
 
b.  Test: “A Degree of Connection” 
After heavy criticism,
108
 the ECJ tried to explain how the applicability 
of the CFR in cases beyond the implementation of EU law may be deter-
mined. After all, the CFR is only a bill of rights specifically for EU law
109
 
and not, contrary to the ECHR, a minimum standard for human rights in all 
of Europe. It presupposes the applicability of EU law to a case. According-
ly, the CFR’s applicability depends on “a certain degree of connection 
above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those 




35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1396, 1406 (2012); Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375, 385 (2012); Case C-108/10, 
Scattolon v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 2011 E.C.R. I-7491, ¶¶ 
118–19. The inclusion of the Wachauf situation within art. 51 CFR had arguably already been 
endorsed by the ECJ in Case C-145/09, Baden-Württemberg v. Tsakouridis, 2010 E.C.R. I-
11979, ¶ 52. 
 106. See Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, ¶¶ 24–30; Schima, supra note 105, at 1108. 
 107. See Emily Hancox, The Meaning of Implementing EU Law under Article 51 (1) of 
the Charter: Akerberg Fransson, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1411, 1423 (2013). Post-
Fransson orders with inconsistent reasoning that declined the application of the CFR also did 
not shed much light on the ECJ’s stance. The ECJ declined application of the Charter in Case 
C-457/09, Chartry v. État belge, 2011 E.C.R. I-819, ¶ 25, and Case C-339/10, Estov v. Minis-
terski savet na Republika Bulgaria, 2010 E.C.R. I-11465, ¶ 14, for lack of a connection of the 
case to EU law, but also formulated concern that the national measure in question did not im-
plement EU law. See Case C-434/11, Corpul National al Politislor v. Ministerul Admin-
istraciei _i Internelor, 2011 E.C.R. I-196, ¶ 16; Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do 
Norte v. Banco Português de Negócios SA, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149, ¶ 12 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
 108. See Fontanelli, supra note 94, at 216–17. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
even saw the Fransson case as a possible threat to national sovereignty. See Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 2013, 133 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277, 313, ¶¶ 88–91 (Ger.). 
 109. According to art. 6(1) TEU, “The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any 
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”. To that effect, see Case 
C-400/10, McB. v. L. E., 2010 E.C.R. I-8965, ¶ 51; Case C-256/11, Dereci v. Bundesministe-
rium für Inneres, 2011 E.C.R. I-11315, ¶ 71; Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, ¶ 23; Case C-
483/12, Pelckmans Turnhout NV v. Walter Van Gastel Balen NV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:304, ¶ 21 
(May 8, 2014); Lenaerts, supra note 105, at 377. 
 110. Case C-206/13, Siragusa v. Sicilia, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶ 24 (Mar. 6, 2014). This 
test has become part of the ECJ’s settled jurisprudence. See, e.g., Case C-198/13, Hernández 
v. Reino de España, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶ 34 (July 10, 2014); Case C-562/12, Liivimaa 
Lihaveis MTÜ v. Eesti-Läti programmi 2007–2013 Seirekomitee, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229, ¶ 
62 (Sept. 17, 2014); Case C-218/15, Paoletti v. Procura della Repubblica, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:748, ¶ 14 (Oct. 6, 2016); Joined Cases C-177 & 178/17, Sas v. Ministero 
della Giustizia, ECLI:EU:C:2017:656, ¶ 19 (Sept. 7, 2017). The ECJ itself traces the formula-
tion back to the pre-Charter Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 1995 E.C.R. I-
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The ECJ later established a (non-exhaustive) list of factors to establish 
such a connection: (1) whether the national legislation is intended to imple-
ment a provision of EU law; (2) the nature of the legislation at issue and 
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it 
is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; (3) whether there are specific rules 
of EU law on the matter or rules which are capable of affecting it.
111
The 
ECJ also stressed the maintenance of previous case-law limiting the ap-
plicability of EU fundamental rights to member states.
112
Notably, EU fun-
damental rights are not applicable to national measures if EU law does not 
impose specific obligations on the Member States in this regard,
113
if the na-
tional measure was not adopted within the framework of measures adopted 
under EU law,
114
and if the only connection of EU law to the measure in 
question is the fact that the EU also possesses power in this area.
115
Fur-
thermore, the ECJ pointed out that EU fundamental rights protection is nec-
essary when the application of different, varying fundamental rights would 
undermine the unity, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.
116
This analysis shows that the ECJ has chosen to undertake a case-by-
case analysis of the applicability of the CFR.
117
The case-law of the ECJ os-
cillates between an expansive understanding of the CFR and the more lim-
ited requirement of a substantive link of a given case to EU law. But the 
general sentiment in all the judgments is that the CFR is the “shadow of EU 
2629, ¶ 16. A similar sentiment had, in a different context, already been expressed in Case 
149/77, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 1978 E.C.R 
1365, ¶¶ 29–33.
111. Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶ 37. This enumeration was introduced in Case 
C-40/11, Iida v. Ulm, ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, ¶ 79 (Nov. 8, 2012), on citizenship, drawing in-
spiration from Case C-309/96, Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comunedi Guidonia, 1997 E.C.R. I-
7493, ¶¶ 21–23. This approach was thought be have been overruled by Fransson. See Sar-
miento, supra note 94, at 1276. However, later citizenship cases rejected this idea. See Case 
C-87/12, Ymeraga v. Ministre du Travail, ECLI:EU:C:2013:291, ¶ 41 (May 8, 2013).
112. Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶¶ 35–36.
113. Case 144/95, Ministère Public v. Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I-2909, ¶¶ 11–12; Siragusa,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶¶ 26–27.
114. Case C-427/06, Bratsch v. Bosch und Siemens Haugeräte, 2008 E.C.R. I-7245, ¶ 
18; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, 2010 E.C.R. I-00365, ¶ 25; Case C-147/08, Rö-
mer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011 E.C.R. I-03591, ¶ 61.
115. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-483/09 & 1/10, Gueye, 2011 E.C.R. I-08263, ¶¶ 55, 69, 
70; Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶¶ 104, 105, 180, 181 (Nov. 22, 
2012).
116. Siragusa, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶ 25. This is mirrored by the fact that the CFR 
allows for the application of national standards within its scope of application, as long as uni-
ty, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law are respected. See Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Fiscal, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, ¶¶ 58–60 (Feb. 26, 2013).
117. Schima, supra note 105, at 1123.
192 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:167
law” and goes wherever EU law goes.
118
With this in mind, the role for the 
CFR in the Glawischnig-Pieszcek case was rather limited.
3. Application to the Case
As this note has argued, the fundamental rights questions raised by up-
load filters were not for the ECJ to decide. But there are other fundamental 
rights issues that are related to the case. They are, however, not properly 
dealt with under EU law. They must be dealt with under national law and 
the ECHR.
At the outset, it is important to note that the scope of the ECJ’s review 
was limited in two important ways. First, the Austrian Supreme Court had 
only asked about situations in which content had already been identified as 
illegal under domestic law. Second, the ECJ was only asked to decide 
whether the ECD would stop the Austrian Supreme Court from ordering 
what it would have ordered under national law. All other questions were ul-
tra petita for the ECJ.
The nature of the preliminary reference procedure before the ECJ only 
emphasizes these limits. It is the sole responsibility of the national courts to 
determine the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance of the ques-
tions referred to the ECJ and the ECJ is then bound to give a ruling on the 
questions referred.
119
The questions referred by a national court can signifi-
cantly predetermine the perspective the ECJ has on a case.
More specifically, the ECJ can only interpret EU law, never national 
law.
120
The ECJ is able to narrow down a question
121
and take into account 
118. Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Place of the Charter in the EU Con-
stitutional Edifice, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1559,
1566–67 (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014).
119. For recent examples, see Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶ 24 (June 16, 2015); Case C-304/16, Am. Express Co. v. The Lords 
Comm’rs of Her Majesty’s Treasury, ECLI:EU:C:2018:66, ¶ 31 (Feb. 7, 2018); Case C-
621/18, Wightman v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 26 
(Dec. 10, 2018).
120. See, e.g., Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 
2000 E.C.R. I-5123, ¶¶ 55–56; Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction Ltd. v. Mayo Cnty. Council, 
2001 E.C.R. I-7725, ¶ 30; Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital v. Administración General 
del Estado, 2002 E.C.R. I-607, ¶ 24; C-212/04, Adeneler v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos, 
2006 E.C.R. I-6057, ¶ 103; Case C-328/04, Vajnai v. Hungary, 2005 E.C.R. I-8577, ¶ 13; 
Case C-287/08, Crocefissa Savia v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 
2008 E.C.R. I-136; Case C-345/09, Van Delft v. College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2010 
E.C.R. I-9879, ¶¶ 110–115; Case C-23/12, Zakaria v. Latvia, ECLI:EU:C:2013:24, ¶ 29 (Jan. 
17, 2013).
121. See, e.g., Case 83/78, Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, ¶¶ 25–26; 
Case 35/85, Procureur de la Republique v. Tissier, 1986 E.C.R. 1207, ¶¶ 5–11; Case C-
228/98, Dounias v. Ipourgos Ikonomikon, 2000 E.C.R. I-577, ¶ 36; Case C-560/15, Europa 
Way Srl v. Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, ECLI:EU:C:2017:593, ¶¶ 35–36
(July 26, 2017); Case C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary Kft. v. Nemzeti Adó- és 
Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2019:861, ¶ 31(Oct. 16, 2019).
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EU law provisions not referred to in the reference if their interpretation is 
necessary to give a complete answer to the question.
122
But the Court is of-
ten reticent to address problems other than those submitted by the national 
court.
123
The ECJ only breaks with this rule if these further issues were 
clearly raised before the national court as a problem of EU law and if the 
ECJ itself has been thoroughly briefed on the issue.
124
Anyone who had 
hoped for a sweeping clarification from the ECJ on all the delicate issues 
concerning the regulation of online speech risked a serious disappointment.
This limitation means that the question is not whether there is some way 
the ECJ could have dealt with the fundamental rights issues this case may 
present. Rather, it must be asked whether these questions arise in this case 
as a matter of interpretation of the ECD. They do not.
a. Declaring Defamatory Content Illegal
The question of which kind of online speech may be banned does not 
fall under the ECD and thus not within the “scope of EU law” relevant for 
this case. The ECD docks to the otherwise established illegality of content. 
The interpretation of the ECD with which the ECJ was tasked in this case 
does not involve determining the illegality of content. Rather, the illegality 
of online content is a prerequisite for the involvement of the ECD, notably 
for the immunities it grants and the injunctions it allows. Any fundamental 
rights questions raised by declaring certain online content illegal are thus of 
no interest to the ECD and, by extension, to the CFR.
To begin with, it should be noted that the EU lacks any consistent poli-
cy on Internet content regulation. EU law only offers sector specific provi-
sions which, as far as speech is concerned, mostly deal with jurisdiction, 
choice of law and the responsibilities of ISPs.
125
The EU has not harmonized 
substantive defamation law
126
and it is doubtful that it could in a general 
122. See, e.g., Case C-387/01, Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg, 2004 
E.C.R. I-4981, ¶ 44; Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. 
I-271, ¶¶ 42–46; Case C-341/08, Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk 
Westfalen-Lippe, 2010 E.C.R. I-47, ¶¶ 47–50; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect 
Commc’n Swed., ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, ¶¶ 45–50 (Apr. 19, 2012); Case C-636/11, Berger v. 
Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:2013:227, ¶ 31 (Apr. 11, 2013). For recent examples, see Case 
C-222/18, VIPA Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. Országos Gyógyszerészeti és Élelmezés-
egészségügyi Intézet, ECLI:EU:C:2019:751, ¶ 50 (June 12, 2019); Case C-671/18, Centraal 
Justitieel Incassobureau v. Z. P., ECLI:EU:C:2019:1054, ¶ 26 (Dec. 5, 2019).
123. See, e.g., Case C-338/89, Slagterier v. Landbrugsministeriet, 1991 E.C.R. I-2315, ¶ 
14; Case C-131/97, Carbonari v. Università degli Studi di Bologna, 1999 E.C.R. I-1103, ¶¶ 
48–53; Case C-311/08, SGI v. Etat Belge, 2010 E.C.R. I-487, ¶¶ 19–23.
124. See Joined Cases C-95 & 96/07, Ecotrade v. Agenzia delle Entrate – Ufficio di Ge-
nova 3, 2008 E.C.R. I-3457, ¶¶ 35–38; Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 67 (Oct. 6, 2015).
125. SAVIN, supra note 26, at 130, 142.
126. Id. at 130.
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manner.
127
The ECD especially shows awareness for its limits, stressing in 
recital 9 that “this Directive is not intended to affect national fundamental 
rules and principles relating to freedom of expression.” This alone, of 
course, does not exclude any interaction of the ECD with the freedom of 
expression or the applicability of the CFR. But it shows that EU law is hap-
pily deferring to national guarantees of freedom of expression.
More specifically, this is demonstrated by how the relevant provisions 
of the ECD function and how they interact with national law. In section 4, 
the ECD sets up a common framework for ISPs in their confrontation with 
illegal content but it nowhere defines what makes content illegal. Both the 
ISP immunities (arts. 12–14 ECD) and the ban on general monitoring obli-
gations (art. 15 ECD) are triggered by the existence of illegal content but the 
ECD has no role in determining the content’s illegality. The ECD does not 
reach the question of what content is illegal. And because the ECD does not 
go into the questions of content illegality, the CFR also cannot go there as a 
“shadow” of the ECD.
The illegality of content that triggers the ECD could result from nation-
al law, but it could also be a result of EU law. If certain EU legislation could 
harmonize the standard for the illegality of certain content, this piece of EU 
legislation would reach the determination of illegality and trigger the ap-
plicability of the CFR to deal with the fundamental rights issues arising 
from this determination of illegality. However, the applicability of the CFR 
would be triggered by EU law’s harmonization of standards for illegality, 
not by the ECD.
There is, however, no legal standard resulting from EU law concerning 
the illegality of defamatory content.
128
The illegality of the content at issue 
in Glawischnig-Piesczek resulted from Sec. 78 UrhG (Law on Copyright) 
and Sec. 1330 (1) ABGB (General Civil Code), which, at least insofar as 
they protect against defamatory speech, cannot be traced back to any EU 
legislation. Sec. 78 UrhG,
129
a copyright statute, is a prohibition on the dis-
semination of images harming the legitimate interests of a person. And Sec. 
127. Specific EU law provisions on content control do exist in Directive 2010/13/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), O.J. 
2010 (L 95) 1. But they are limited to specific issues that arise indirectly from the otherwise 
regulated area. See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 142.
128. SAVIN, supra note 26, at 130.
129. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Act], July 1, 1936, BGBL I at 1273 § 78 
(1) (Ger). (“Images representing a person must neither be displayed publicly nor otherwise 
publicly disseminated in another way, if this harms the legitimate interests of the person pic-
tured . . .”) (translation provided by the author).
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1330(1) ABGB
130
provides compensation for anyone who has suffered actu-
al harm or loss of profit owing to an injury of their honor. The ECD docks 
to those kinds of statutes without any substantive or formal link to them. 
The substantive reasons for this illegality do not matter to the ECD, which 
by design takes its cue from an external determination of illegality.
Different standards of the illegality of certain content are the default 
setting under which the ECD operates. Accordingly, it seems strenuous at 
best to construct a sufficient connection between the ECD and the national 
norms that determine content illegality which would trigger the guarantees 
of the CFR in the application of these national norms. In cases where a na-
tional norm merely triggers the ECD instead of another EU norm, EU law 
simply is not concerned with the substantive determination of illegality. Be-
cause EU law does not reach these questions, the Charter cannot reach them 
either.
b. Designing Injunctions
A little more delicate is the question whether the CFR should have 
played a more prominent role in establishing what kind of injunctions art. 
15 ECD and art. 18 ECD allow.
The ECD, despite granting immunities to ISPs in arts. 12–14, specifi-
cally allows for injunctions against the ISPs to terminate or prevent in-
fringements in arts. 12(3), 13(2), and 14(3) ECD. Art. 18(1) ECD further 
puts member states under an obligation to make measures available under 
national law to terminate any infringement and protect against further in-
fringements. Any injunction like the one issued by the Austrian Courts in 
this case can be understood as a fulfillment of this obligation. As such, in 
issuing injunctions, member states courts are effectively “implementing EU 
law.” Because EU law governs these kinds of injunctions, the CFR “shad-
ows” EU law in this respect. The CFR must thus generally be respected by 
these injunctions. In determining what these injunctions may look like re-
garding the limits of the ECD, the ECJ must have due regard to the guaran-
tees of the CFR. This requirement means that the question whether art. 15 
ECD allows a national court to include identical or equivalent content in an 
injunction must, as a general matter, comply with the CFR. Yet, things are 
more complicated than this.
It must be noted, again, that the ECD fully defers to other sources of 
law to define the infringements that injunctions can target. In the Glaw-
ischnig-Piesczek case, these happen to be national sources of law not subject 
to the CFR. Even though the existence and the extent of the injunctions is 
determined by EU law, the infringement which they are targeting is not de-
130. Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 1, 1917, § 1330 
(Ger). (“If anyone has sustained actual harm or loss of profit through defamation, he is enti-
tled to demand compensation.”) (translation provided by the author).
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termined by EU law. In this regard, the ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD 
and the injunctions it allows only extends to content which shares in all re-
spects all the relevant characteristics that led national courts to find the orig-
inal content illegal. Any interests of the creator content and any interests of 
another user who wishes to view this content are exactly the same interests 
that were at play with regard to the initial content and were found to be un-
compelling under national law.
This interpretation means that the fundamental rights interests involved 
in the decision to extend the injunction to identical and equivalent content 
are merely duplications of fundamental rights decisions made under national 
law. All the identical or equivalent postings could individually be subject to 
an injunction and the CFR would have absolutely no role in determining 
whether these contents could be declared illegal and included in injunctions.
If the CFR got involved in determining whether the extension of the in-
junction to identical or equivalent content is possible, the CFR would be 
able to prohibit the extension of one injunction to content which, as a matter 
of EU law, could be subject to individual injunctions, even though the fun-
damental rights interests at issue do not differ at all. The CFR would have to 
take issue with extending the injunction to content that by itself was also 
perfectly suited to be included in an injunction. This means that when eval-
uated under the CFR, the determination of illegality and the balance of in-
terests involved would have to come out differently than it would have un-
der national law. To check the extension of injunctions to identical or 
equivalent content for its compliance with the CFR thus also means to sec-
ond-guess the national determination of illegality, which could not be ques-
tioned if it were made in individual injunctions.
To establish such a backdoor is extremely problematic, given the limits 
of the CFR. EU defamation law is non-existent and EU law generally defers 
to national law in these matters. In this particular situation, the design of the 
injunction, which came within the scope of EU law, would force EU law to 
determine the illegality of content, which EU law tends to fully avoid and 
does not, as a matter of the ECD, have any business in. The material link of 
the breadth of injunctions and the content’s illegality does not seem strong 
enough to extend the CFR to these questions. It would therefore be an undue 
intrusion of EU law into the reserved sphere of the member states if the 
CFR were able to second guess fundamental rights determinations by the 
member states through the backdoor of ECD injunctions.
Still, any other question regarding the design and impact of the injunc-
tions, warrants the application of the CFR. For example, it could be debated 
whether the ECJ should have considered the incentives broad injunctions set 
for the over-policing content. The dangers of over-blocking are regularly 
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recounted whenever ISPs are required by law to moderate content.
131
But as 
even the most ardent critics of measures allegedly leading to over-blocking 
must admit, over-blocking is an economically driven reaction by the ISPs to 
shield themselves against liability for under-blocking.
132
It is far from clear 
why the detriment to rights caused by an economic choice to over-enforce 
rules that demand nothing but the elimination of illegal content should be 
attributed to the state as an abridgment of fundamental rights. Because over-
blocking is not mandated by the laws and merely an economically motivat-
ed reaction by ISPs to deal with their removal obligations, the ISPs and not 
the state or the laws are to blame for this phenomenon. Over-blocking con-
cerns may be legitimate in a policy debate, but over-blocking is not a direct, 
legally mandated consequence of these laws that should lead courts to un-
derenforce removal obligations out of fear that companies might bluntly do 
more than they are required to.
c. Fundamental Rights of ISPs
Unlike the speech related fundamental rights determinations, any other 
aspect of the design and impact of the injunctions under the ECD is subject 
to a review under the CFR. Most notably, this means that the right of the 
ISP to conduct a business under art. 16 CFR is involved.
The case-law of the ECJ recognizes a limited scope of this right. Art. 16 
CFR protects the freedom to exercise an economic activity, freedom of con-
tract, and free competition.
133
It extends to the protection of business se-
crets
134
and encompasses the right for any business to be able to freely use, 
within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and 
131. Most statistical and anecdotal evidence comes from the experience with the DMCA 
safe harbors. See, e.g., Jennifer Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 483, 489, 514–20 (2018) (analyzing “288,675 notices containing 
well over 100 million (108,331,663) individual takedown requests—i.e., claims of infringe-
ment.”).
132. For a critique that the GDPR sets such incentives, see Daphne Keller, The Right 
Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection 
Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 332 (2018).
133. Case C-134/15, Lidl GmbH & Co. v. Freistaat Sachsen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:498, ¶ 28 
(June 30, 2016). The right to exercise economic or commercial activity dates back to cases 
like Case 4/73 Nold v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1974 E.C.R. 491, ¶ 14, and Case 230/78, 
SpA Eridiana v. Minister Agric. & Forestry, 1979 E.C.R. 2749, ¶¶ 20, 31. The right to free-
dom of contract had been recognized, inter alia, in cases such as Case 151/78, Nykøbing v. 
Ministry of Agric., 1979 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 19, and Case C-240/97, Spain v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-
6571, ¶ 99. Free competition is recognized by TFEU arts. 119 (1) and (3).
134. Case C-1/11, Interseroh Scrap and Metals Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Mgmt.-
Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:194, ¶ 43 (Mar. 29, 2012).
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financial resources available to it.
135
However, the success rate of claims re-
lated to art. 16 CFR has been exceptionally low before the ECJ.
136
In contrast to Scarlet,137 in which the ECJ found the injunction at issue 
to be a disproportionate limitation of art. 16 CFR, because the injunction did 
not strike a fair balance of the interests involved,
138
the ECJ did not under-
take such a balancing test under art. 16 CFR in Glawischnig-Piesczek. But 
the ECJ resorted to a balancing test inspired by recital 41 of the Directive,
139
finding that interpretation of art. 15 ECD struck a fair balance between the 
different interests protected by the ECD.
140
It is not obvious that conducting 
this balancing test under art. 16 CFR would have changed the outcome of 
the case.
d. The Role of the ECJ, National Law and the ECHR
Vigilance for fundamental rights protection is obviously very important. 
Even though the ECJ has become a vigorous defender of Charter rights,
141
commentators should not give the ECJ an easy pass when fundamental 
rights are not duly considered. However, as the foregoing considerations 
have tried to show, applying the CFR can be a tricky business and a thor-
ough analysis of its scope is often warranted.
For now, critics of the fundamental rights situation in the Glawischnig-
Piesczek case must turn to the guarantees of fundamental rights in the mem-
135. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, ¶ 49 (Mar. 27, 2014).
136. Peter Oliver, What Purpose Does Article 16 of the Charter Serve?, in GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 281 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds. 2013).
137. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959.
138. Id. ¶ 53.
139. Recital 41 states: “This Directive strikes a balance between the different interests at 
stake and establishes principles upon which industry agreements and standards can be based.”
140. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 46 (Oct. 3, 2019).
141. For examples regarding arts. 7 and 8 CFR, see Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09 Schecke 
v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I-11063; Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights 
Ireland v. Minister for Comms., Marine & Nat. Resources, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (Apr. 8, 
2014); Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015); Joined Cases C 203/15 & C 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB 
v. Post-och telestyrelsen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (Dec. 21, 2016); Opinion 1/15, Transfer of 
Passenger Name Record Data from the European Union to Canada, ECLI:EU:C:2017:592 
(July 26, 2017); Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020); Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 & C-520/18, La 
Quadrature du Net v. Premier ministre and Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone 
v. Conseil des ministres, ECLI:EU:2020:791 (Oct. 6, 2020); Case C-623/17, Privacy Int’l v. 
Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affs., ECLI:EU:C:2020:790 (Oct. 6, 2020).
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ber states and to the ECHR.
142
In particular, Austria has had certain prob-
lems in the past in complying with art. 10 ECHR.
143
It is the responsibility 
of the Austrian courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to 
ensure compliance with the ECHR. Any fundamental rights-based objec-
tions to the Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment could have been raised in those 
venues, but it was not for the ECJ to ensure Austria’s compliance with the 
ECHR. Instead, the ECJ left intact the delicate separation of responsibilities 
created by the three layers of European fundamental rights protection.
D. Global Removal Orders: Respecting the Limits of EU Law
What makes Glawischnig-Piesczek so intriguing is that it does not only 
deal with intricate questions of speech rights on the Internet and the regula-
tion of ISPs but that it also ventures into the delicate jurisdictional questions 
Internet governance poses. The Austrian Supreme Court also submitted a 
question to the ECJ regarding the territorial scope of the injunctions it 
planned to issue against Facebook and was seeking clarification on the lim-
its EU law might set in this regard. The ECJ’s answer was as short and sim-
ple as it was compelling: not many.
1. A Bête Noire of Internet Regulation
Some commentators display an almost reflexive rejection of any kind of 
Internet removal orders with extraterritorial reach.
144
The emotions run high 
in these matters and the fact that a coherent theory of jurisdiction in online 
cases still has not been found
145
adds to the difficulty of the discussion. The 
142. For a comprehensive study of the ECtHR’s case-law on the Freedom of Expression 
of the Internet, see generally WOLFGANG BENEDEK & MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN, LIBERTÉ 
D’EXPRESSION ET INTERNET 23–54 (2013).
143. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82 (1986); Oberschlick v. Austria I, 
App. No. 11662/85 (1991); Oberschlick v. Austria II, App. No. 10834/92 (1997); see general-
ly Lukas Gahleitner, Wie meinen?, JURIDIKUM, 2019, at 123.
144. Keller, supra note 61, at 35; Dan J. Svantesson, Grading AG Szpunar’s Opinion in 
Case C-18/18 – A Caution Against Worldwide Content Blocking as Default, 13 MASARYK U.
J.L. & TECH. 389, 400 (2019) [hereinafter Svantesson, Grading AG Szpunar’s Opinion] (as-
serting that a “court with jurisdiction founded in EU law does not enjoy unfettered global ju-
risdiction just because it applies national law.”); Dan J. Svantesson, Bad News for the Internet 
as Europe’s Top Court Opens the Door for Global Content Blocking Orders [Amended 
Again], LINKEDIN (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bad-news-internet-europes-
top-court-opens-door-global-svantesson [hereinafter Svantesson, Europe’s Top Court].
145. Although, there are some preliminary works in this direction. For a list of works by 
the Internet and Jurisdiction Policy Network, see generally INTERNET & JURISDICTION POL’Y
NETWORK, https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/work/content-jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 2, 
2020).
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ECJ adds extremely little to this discussion by offering only five short para-
graphs.
146
The reasons supporting global removal orders in Internet cases rest 
mostly on efficiency concerns in the light of the global nature of the Inter-
net. This is illustrated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in the case 
of Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., an intellectual property case, in 
which the court upheld a takedown order with worldwide effect.
147
Critics 
lament the inconsistency of such a possibility with comity.
148
Others argue 
that comity does not require an automatic deference to interests of other 
states, but only to determine whether such interests exist and then to seri-
ously consider whether they are worth deferring to.
149
Some called the 
Equustek judgment “ominous,”150 “potentially quite dangerous,”151 and 
warned that it could be abused by authoritarian regimes to globally delist 
any unwelcome content from online search results.
152
Its defenders point to 
the carefully crafted limiting principles set out in the Equustek case.153 It is 
also argued that enforceability of such global removal orders would, at least 
in the United States, not be automatic, but could be denied if “the cause of 
action . . . or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the 
United States . . . .”
154
Beyond case specific debates, scholars are busy de-
146. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 48–52 (Oct. 3, 2019).
147. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, ¶ 41 (Can.) (Abella, 
J., writing for a 7-2 majority of the Court, aptly explained that “[t]he problem in this case is 
occurring online and globally. The Internet has no borders—its natural habitat is global. The 
only way to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its objective was to have it apply 
where Google operates—globally.”)
148. Complaint at 43, Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols., Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-NC (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206818.
149. See Andrew K. Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 390 
(2018).
150. Daphne Keller, Ominous: Canadian Court Orders Google to Remove Search Re-
sults Globally, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y BLOG (June 28, 2017, 11:31 AM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/06/ominous-canadian-court-orders-google-remove-
search-results-globally.
151. Eugene Volokh, ‘Canadian Court Orders Google to Remove Search Results Glob-
ally’, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/06/29/canadian-court-orders-google-to-remove-search-results-globally.
152. Michael Geist, Global Internet Takedown Orders Come to Canada: Supreme Court 
Upholds International Removal of Google Search Results, MICHAEL GEIST (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-internet-takedown-orders-come-canada-supreme-
court-upholds-international-removal-google-search-results.
153. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, ¶¶ 43–53 (Can.); An-
drew K. Woods, No, the Canadian Supreme Court Did Not Ruin the Internet, LAWFARE (July 
06, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/no-canadian-supreme-court-did-not-ruin-
Internet.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(d) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
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veloping general frameworks for these issues – proposing for example a re-
buttable presumption in favor of geographic segmentation.
155
EU law, for its part, knows only few instances of genuine extraterritori-
al application, mostly confined to financial regulations.
156
EU legislation re-
quiring the evaluation of foreign conduct or third country law while main-
taining a territorial connection with the EU
157
is, on the other hand, 
relatively common.
158
A recent example includes art. 3 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation, defining its territorial scope. This article can be un-
derstood as part of the EU’s mission to “uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens” in its relations with 
the world, as art. 3(5) TEU provides.
159
The case-law of the ECJ that affords 
a robust protection of the data of EU citizens when they are transferred to 
third-countries also fits into this narrative.
160
Nothing regarding these delicate questions appeared in Glawischnig-
Pieszcek. Instead, the ECJ resorted to a technical answer, limited to the 
question put before it.
2. Nothing to See Here: The ECD’s Silence on Global Removal Orders
All the ECJ has been asked to do was to clarify whether the ECD pro-
hibits injunctions with worldwide effects. The ECJ finds that it does not, 
pointing to art. 18(1) ECD and the ECD’s general lack of territorial limita-
tions when it comes to the reach of injunctions.
161
As argued above, these 
injunctions might come within the “scope of EU law” for the purposes of 
the CFR. But neither the ECD nor the CFR contain any clear limits with re-
gards to the territorial scope of the injunctions. And even some of the Courts 
harshest critics agree that the ECJ got it right in this regard.
162
Even if the 
l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam); Woods, supra
note 149, at 391–93.
155. Daskal, supra note 71, at 1651.
156. Joanne Scott, The Global Reach of EU Law, in EU LAW BEYOND EU BORDERS:
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW 21, 24 (Marisa Cremona & Joanne Scott eds., 
2019).
157. For this distinction between ‘extraterritoriality’ and ‘territorial extension’, see Jo-
anne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 
90 (2014).
158. Scott, supra note 156, at 24.
159. See generally Christopher Kuner, The Internet and the Global Reach of EU law, in
EU LAW BEYOND EU BORDERS: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW 112 (Marisa 
Cremona & Joanne Scott eds., 2019).
160. See, e.g., Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015); Opinion 1/15, Accord PNR EU-Canada, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:592 (July 26, 2017); Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ire-
land, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
161. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 48–49 (Oct. 3, 2019).
162. See, e.g., Kettemann & Tiedke, supra note 71; Keller, supra note 61, at 36.
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Austrian Courts were not the proper venue for this specific case, as Face-
book, the Latvian, and the Finish governments had argued before the ECJ,
163
this would still be true, because art. 35 of the recast Brussels I Regulation 
places the responsibility for injunctions firmly in the hands of national 
courts under their own national law, even if courts of another member state 
have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
164
The applicable EU law thus puts 
national courts in charge in this regard. Limits of their discretion to deter-
mine the appropriate territorial scope deriving directly from EU law are not 
evident.
The ECJ, however, was aware of the intricate questions that are raised 
by global removal orders. It showed itself cognizant of the limits created by 
comity
165
and made clear that, as a matter of EU law, the determination on 
whether an injunction with worldwide effect is issued must be made in ac-
cordance with the applicable rules of international law.
166
The ECJ derives 
this one limit from recitals 58 and 60 of the ECD, which express the wish of 
the EU legislator to keep EU law in accordance with international law.
167
This simple reference to international law as a whole grossly oversimplifies 
the actual problems and is far from precise, but the applicable law is also far 
from precise. EU law has nothing more to offer on these questions and the 
ECJ declined to artfully invent any standards that lack any grounding in the 
applicable EU law. Arguably, the ECJ even manifestly lacks jurisdiction to 
make any further clarifications on these unresolved questions of Interna-
tional law.
Any other course of action would have led the ECJ to set a standard in a 
highly contentious issue of International law on which the ECJ was neither 
asked to rule nor had any jurisdiction to rule on. It is an odd position to uni-
ronically demand that the ECJ prevent national courts from issuing injunc-
tions they are allegedly not allowed to issue,
168
by giving a ruling on things 
it was not asked to and could not rule on due to a lack of jurisdiction. Before 
the ECJ, this case was never about all the intricate questions of jurisdiction 
163. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 86 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar) (¶¶ 82–
86 also explain why the Austrian courts did have jurisdiction over the case).
164. 2012 O.J. (L 351) 13 (“Application may be made to the courts of a Member State 
for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that 
Member State, even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the sub-
stance of the matter.”).
165. Keller, supra note 61, at 38 (urging the Court to do so).
166. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 51.
167. Id. ¶ 3 (recital 58 ECD reads in relevant part: “in view of the global dimension of 
electronic commerce, it is, however, appropriate to ensure that the Community rules are con-
sistent with international rules”; recital 60 ECD reads in relevant part: “In order to allow the 
unhampered development of electronic commerce, the legal framework must be . . . consistent 
with the rules applicable at international level so that it does not adversely affect the competi-
tiveness of European industry or impede innovation in that sector.”).
168. See Svantesson, Europe’s Top Court, supra note 144.
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and comity. It was about what the ECD can contribute to this debate, which 
is very little. These battles will have to be fought in front of national courts 
contemplating global injunctions. These national courts, as the example of a 
Belgian Court of Appeals shows,
169
should be presumed to be more than 
able to live up to this task.
3. Comparing Glawischnig-Piesczek to Google v. CNIL
A judgment the ECJ delivered merely nine days before Glawischnig-
Piesczek may have contributed to the confusion. In Google LLC v. CNIL,170
the ECJ had ruled that the obligations for search engines under the so-called 
“Right to be Forgotten”
171
are limited to de-referencing search items on the 
versions of search engines corresponding to EU member states and do not 
extend to every globally available version of that search engine. The ECJ 
has been praised for its restraint in this case, which some declared to be a 
victory for Google.
172
How does Glawischnig-Piesczek fit into this?
It is important to note the fundamentally different settings of the two 
cases. Google v. CNIL involved the question whether EU law requires glob-
al de-referencing. In Glawischnig-Piesczek, the ECJ was asked to clarify 
whether EU law prohibited a global removal order. On the latter question, 
the two judgments are remarkably similar. All the ECJ decided (and was 
asked to decide) in Glawischnig-Piesczek was that art. 15 ECD does not 
169. See Geert van Calster, Brussels Court of Appeal Rejects Jurisdiction Against Face-
book Inc, Facebook Ireland in Privacy, Data Protection Case, GAVC LAW BLOG (JUNE 19,
2019), https://gavclaw.com/2019/06/19/brussels-court-of-appeal-rejects-jurisdiction-against-
facebook-inc-facebook-ireland-in-privacy-data-protection-case/ (reporting on a case in which 
the Brussels Court of Appeals held that it had no jurisdiction over Facebook Ireland or Face-
book, Inc.).
170. See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), ECLI :EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
171. Derived from arts. 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 by the ECJ in Case C-131/12, Google Spain 
SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014), and 
since explicitly enshrined in art. 17 GDPR. For the many scholarly contributions concerning 
the judgment and its broader implications, see, e.g., Robert L. Bolton III, The Right to Be 
Forgotten: Forced Amnesia in the Digital Age, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L.
133, 136 (2014); Chelsea E. Carbone, To Be or Not to Be Forgotten: Balancing the Right to 
Know with the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 533 
(2015); Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1 (2015); Aidan Forde, Implications of the Right to Be Forgotten, 18 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 83 (2015); PAUL LAMBERT, THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN –
INTERPRETATION AND PRACTICE (2019); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Priva-
cy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 
DUKE L.J. 981 (2018).
172. Sarah Marsh, Right to Be Forgotten on Google Only Applies in EU, Court Rules,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/24/victory-
for-google-in-landmark-right-to-be-forgotten-case.
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stop a member state court from issuing global removal orders.
173 Google v. 
CNIL holds explicitly that, even though EU law currently174 does not require 
global de-referencing, EU law does not prohibit this and leaves it up to the 
national data protection authorities to decide under national fundamental 
rights standards on such global de-referencing.
175
To find these judgments to 
be inconsistent
176
, one must ignore how openly the ECJ in Google v. CNIL 
endorsed national Internet regulation with extraterritorial effect.
177
The 
Google v. CNIL judgment is far from a victory for Google and others who 
argue against extraterritorial Internet regulation in the EU.
178
There are many good reasons to think that the ECJ should have decided 
in favor of a global applicability of the Right to be Forgotten in Google v. 
CNIL. However, it is important to note that Google v. CNIL did not have to 
come out the way it did for Glawischnig-Piesczek to make sense. Neither 
case expounded a general theory of the extraterritoriality of European Inter-
net regulation. Both cases are clearly limited to their respective legal 
frameworks, the GDPR and the ECD. Having found that art. 17 GDPR does 
not require global de-referencing does not prejudice whether art. 15 ECD 
allows national courts to issue global removal orders for illegal content. 
Contrary to the GDPR, art. 15 ECD harmonizes only specific aspects and 
art. 18 ECD leaves national courts a broad discretion in remedying rights 
violations. Nothing in the ECD sets any limits for national courts to issue 
such takedown orders.
179
The Court simply held as much.
173. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 50 (Oct. 3, 2019).
174. The ECJ also clearly affirms that the EU legislator could have enacted a global 
right to be forgotten. See Google LLC, ECLI :EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 58 (“Such considerations 
[concerning the global nature of the Internet and the effects this has on the rights of Union 
citizens] are such as to justify the existence of a competence on the part of the EU legislature 
to lay down the obligation, for a search engine operator, to carry out, when granting a request 
for de-referencing made by such a person, a de-referencing on all the versions of its search 
engine.”).
175. Id. ¶ 72.
176. See, e.g., Cathryn Hopkins, Territorial Scope in Recent CJEU Cases: Google v. 
CNIL / Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook, INFORRM (Nov. 9, 2019), 
https://inforrm.org/2019/11/09/territorial-scope-in-recent-cjeu-cases-google-v-cnil-
glawischnig-piesczek-v-facebook-cathryn-hopkins.
177. Andrew K. Woods, Three Things to Remember from Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgot-
ten’ Decisions, LAWFARE (Oct.1, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-things-
remember-europes-right-be-forgotten-decisions.
178. Mary Samonte, Google v. CNIL: The Territorial Scope of the Right to Be Forgot-
ten Under EU Law, 4 EUR. PAPERS 839, 845 (2019).
179. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 71, at 1624.
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IV. Impulses for Online Speech Regulation
The foregoing analysis of the ruling has tried to show both its limited 
scope and, despite its often unclear, cryptic, and unstructured style, its over-
all convincing reasoning and result. Much of the criticism directed at the 
ECJ does not hold up against a thorough analysis of the judgment. The lim-
ited scope of both the questions presented and the rationale supporting the 
ECJ’s answers should be recognized and considered when the judgment is 
inevitably scrutinized for EU law’s contribution to the regulation of online 
speech.
Many questions remain unanswered. But the judgment should be read 
as providing two key impulses for the future debate of Internet regulation: 
ISP responsibility for illegal speech and the need for the development of 
sensible rules of jurisdiction and comity in the digital era.
A. Recognizing the Problem and the Provider’s Responsibilities
1. Of Moles and Aphids
If there is a coherent theme that runs through the Glawischnig-Piesczek 
judgment, it is that of an efficient protection of the rights of those harmed 
by illegal online content. The ECJ understands the ECD as a framework that 
adequately remedies violations of rights and interests that have occurred 
online. This reading is based on a functionalist reading of art. 18(1) ECD 
and its obligation for member states to ensure that courts can adopt rapid 
measures to fully protect the rights and interests involved. Once illegal con-
tent is identified, EU law allows for efficient removal orders that go far be-
yond notice-and-takedown procedures.
These procedures, of course, stands in direct contrast to the frameworks 
developed in the United States. Although applicable in copyright law, the 
“DMCA Safe Harbors” of 17 U.S.C. § 512 provide an adequate point of ref-
erence in this regard, because they are designed similarly to the ECD, but 
have been interpreted quite differently. Much like arts. 12–14 ECD provide 
the ISPs with immunity from liability for conduiting, caching or hosting il-
legal content, Secs. 512(a)–(d) establish similar immunities in the copyright 
context.
180
Art. 15 ECD does not allow for a general obligation to monitor 
and Sec. 512(m)(1) clarifies that the immunity cannot be conditioned
181
on
“a service provider monitoring its service affirmatively seeking facts indi-
cating infringing activity”.
180. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d).
181. In this regard, the connection between the intensity of a monitoring obligation and 
the immunities of ISPs under the ECD uncovered by Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. 
Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 36–40 (Oct. 3, 2019), is made explicit by § 
512(m).
206 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:167
In contrast to the ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD, Sec. 512(m) has 
consistently been interpreted quite narrowly. Most prominently in cases like 
Viacom v. Youtube and Capital Records v. Vimeo, it has been established 
that no form of active participation can be required from service providers at 
all.
182
This fits rather well into the elaborate notice-and-takedown frame-
work that Sec. 512 established,
183
but it also makes it necessary to send out 
new takedown notices for every copyright violation that has occurred, lead-
ing to an endless game of “whack-a-mole” for someone who wishes to see 
their rights protected.
184
This inefficiency is precisely what Glawischnig-
Piesczek, informed by an expansive reading of art. 18 ECD, rejected.
Speech on social networks is characterized by a combination of persis-
tence in time, visibility, ability to spread, and searchability.
185
This special 
nature of social networks is explicitly highlighted by the ECJ to justify its 
rigid stance on the removal of illegal content on these platforms.
186
The ECJ 
extends these concerns to all kinds of online content. But the serious dan-
gers of hate speech
187
combined with the fact that many European countries 
find hate speech to be unprotected illegal speech, make this orientation es-
pecially compelling in the European hate speech context. Given the nature 
of social networks, a formalistic notice-and-takedown approach makes little 
sense. Rather, a procedure that allows the removal of all other identical and 
narrowly defined equivalent illegal content adequately neutralizes the threat. 
The narrow definition of equivalent content which the ECJ advances is, in-
sofar, an important feature to limit the solution to the problem.
Sticking with the “whack-a-mole”-metaphor, according to the vision of 
the Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment, illegal online content is not like having 
a mole in your garden which is only destroying your lawn when it surfaces 
and can be “whacked” when it does. Rather, it is like an infestation with 
aphids that are constantly multiplying and spreading through the entire gar-
den, continuously repeating their destructive work. They can only be fought 
by a broadly applied insecticide. Ideally, this insecticide only targets these 
kinds of parasites and does not harm other animals and plants.
This approach requires substantial work from the ISPs. For the ECJ, 
this focus on the ISPs is a natural result of art. 15 ECD’s focus on ISP obli-
gations, which it was asked to interpret. However, it is also a statement 
182. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012); Capitol Rec-
ords, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
183. See Emily M. Asp, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: User Ex-
perience and User Frustration, 103 IOWA L. REV. 751, 761 (2018).
184. Although, some argue that the current framework DMCA framework already chills 
too much protected speech and should be amended. See id. at 763–64.
185. DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11 
(2014).
186. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 36 (Oct. 3, 2019).
187. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 65–104, 204–34 (2012).
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about the inherent responsibilities of ISPs for the services they are offering. 
In fact, there is nothing unusual about such a responsibility: any other com-
pany conducting a business with potential harms for society and potential 
illegal outcome has the responsibility to prevent, deal with, and carry the 
consequences of these potential harms and illegalities. Companies either 
make sure their business does not harm people and does not violate the law, 
or the service cannot be offered. This responsibility also gives these compa-
nies significant power because they are the first ones that can decide how to 
comply with any given regulation. But this power is obviously subject to 
judicial control. There is nothing unusual in this construction either, insofar 
as companies are always primarily responsible to ensure compliance with 
the law, even if their compliance decisions impact individual rights, as is the 
case with health or environmental regulations. Granting not only immunity 
from liability for third-party content, but also allowing for inaction when the 
use of the service harms protected rights and interests in the name of inno-
vation and technological advancement
188
subordinates these rights and inter-
ests to the economic well-being of tech-companies, who are even benefit-
ting from this kind of traffic on their services. With a forceful grounding in 
art. 18(1) ECD, the ECJ has taken the illegality of the content at issue as a 
cue for allowing decisive and efficient action to eliminate illegal content, 
pushing ISPs to accept the responsibility EU law has assigned to them.
2. Any Impulses for U.S. Legislation?
This European approach would run into significant difficulties in the 
United States as far as speech rights are concerned. At the outset, the strictly 
defined categories of unprotected speech,
189
which only encompass the “his-
toric and traditional categories long familiar to the bar”
190
severely limit the 
scope of evidently illegal speech that EU law presupposes. Moreover, the 
fact that content-based restrictions of speech
191
are subject to strict scrutiny 
188. As was the case for the DMCA safe harbors which were hailed to be “the law that 
saved the web”. David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law that Saved 
the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later.
189. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010), for an exclusive list of un-
protected speech with many further references.
190. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
191. Defined as restrictions of expression “because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content” in Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); as re-
strictions “adopted . . . because of the disagreement with the message [the speech] conveyed”
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); or as “a law [that] applies to par-
ticular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed” in Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
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by the Courts
192
has plagued legislators when trying to deal with undesirable 
speech online.
193
Even legislation limited to the removal of clearly unprotected speech 
but including a removal obligation extending to identical and equivalent 
content would need to withstand serious overbreadth and vagueness chal-
lenges under the First Amendment. Depending on its design, a statute mod-
eled after the European example could conceivably chill a third party’s law-
ful speech
194
because through the broad reach
195
of ISP obligations, it could 
lead to the take-down of “a substantial amount of protected speech”
196
, un-
less it is susceptible to a limiting construction that would cure its unconstitu-
tional defect.
197
Relatedly, vagueness doctrine in the First Amendment con-
text requires an especially clear demarcation of what kind of speech is 
targeted by the law and prohibits any uncertain meanings for their chilling 
effect
198
which will be a challenge, as the controllable, but broad formulas 
used by the ECJ have shown.
Some cases seem to set a high bar for online legislation to pass muster 
under this standard and make it seem unlikely that any law could stand that 
does not specifically and exclusively in any given application affect unpro-
tected speech.
199
Other, more limited versions of the overbreadth doctrine 
exist in the case-law, however, making its actual force difficult to deter-
mine.
200
Especially in the context of online harassment, courts have shown 
192. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 118; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 395 (1992); Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
193. See, e.g., State of North Carolina v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 880 (2016) (holding a 
cyberbullying statute to be a content-based restriction failing the applicable strict scrutiny 
standard); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding a provision prohibiting trans-
mission of obscene or indecent communications by means of telecommunications device to 
persons under age 18, or sending patently offensive communications through use of interac-
tive computer service to persons under age 18 to be unconstitutional.).
194. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
195. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
197. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
198. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1959) (“[T]his Court has in-
timated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute 
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech.”); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 
(1972); see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75–99 (1960).
199. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
200. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (“a law should not be in-
validated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applica-
tions”); id. at 772 (connecting the overbreadth doctrine directly to the chilling effect on pro-
tected speech a law might have); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 
(1998) (upholding as not substantially overbroad a federal statute directing the National En-
dowment of the Arts, in establishing procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant applica-
tions, to take into considerations “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse 
beliefs and values of the American public”).
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their willingness to construct statutes in a way that saves them from over-
breadth and vagueness challenges.
201
It seems difficult to conceive that the loss of some valid speech could 
be balanced against the efficient removal of all harmful, unprotected speech 
in U.S. law. Under a strict interpretation of the overbreadth doctrine, insist-
ing on efficient removal of identical and equivalent content will probably 
not be upheld. But this would be a construction of the overbreadth doctrine 
that sanctions any conceivable application of the law without much regard 
for its actual requirements.
Because the ECJ’s conception of removable identical and equivalent 
content is strictly limited to content that is just as illegal as the initial con-
tent and shares all factors that led to the finding of illegality of the initial 
content, the removal obligation is strictly limited to categories of defined 
illegality. Mere imprecision in removal by providers for economic conven-
ience should, in any event, not suffice to make the statute itself overbroad, 
because the ISPs could rid themselves of an unwanted obligation by incom-
petently dealing with it. Similarly, whether the danger of over-blocking 
should play a role would depend on how willing the courts are to see the 
reason for such an overbroad application in the law itself, or only in the 
economic considerations of ISPs that would make them block more than 
they should.
In any case, legislative creativity could also limit the success of over-
breadth challenges: for example, human involvement in specific cases could 
be required. This involvement could take the form of a unanimous vote of a 
group of informed experts in uncertain cases to remove content, essentially 
limiting the removal obligation to “evidently” identical or equivalent con-
tent. This requirement might be an additional burden on ISPs, but a possible 
safeguard as a matter of First Amendment law.
B. Enforcement and Power
Finally, the lack of any clear guidance concerning the global reach of 
takedown orders against Internet companies evidences the need for the de-
velopment of a theory of jurisdiction and comity in the digital age.
202
The 
ECJ did not and could not have articulated such a theory in its judgment. 
These questions are properly dealt with by the national courts contemplating 
these issues in cases when they arise.
It seems likely that these issues, for now, will be resolved by the mech-
anisms of recognition and enforcement. The litigation in the United States 
201. See Lebo v. State, 474 S.W.3d 402, 406–08 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that that 
communications proscribed by statute delineating offense of harassment through electronic 
communication did not fall within scope of free speech protected by First Amendment, and 
thus statute was not unconstitutional on its face).
202. Kettemann & Tiedke, supra note 71.
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following the Canadian Equustek judgment illustrates how this might func-
tion. In this litigation, Google succeeded in blocking the global removal or-
der from enforcement in the United States.
203
As already pointed out, en-
forcement of global removal orders is by no means always automatic.
Fundamentally, courts that issue removal orders with global reach will 
inevitably run into difficulties in their enforcement abroad, as they will have 
to rely on their judicial counterparts in other countries if they cannot order 
the use of state power against the relevant ISP within their jurisdiction. This 
enforcement leaves the companies with a significant advantage of being 
able to strategically make an assessment whether they can find a way to re-
sist orders of which they do not approve. If there are no assets in a given ju-
risdiction against which an order can be enforced and if the company can 
count on domestic courts to reject the domestic enforcement of the foreign 
judgment like in the Equustek litigation,204 such companies can effectively 
resist removal orders. The economic importance of the jurisdiction that is-
sued such a global order will likely play a significant role in deciding 
whether this jurisdiction can have a say in the struggle to regulate the Inter-
net.
Conclusion
This note has tried to thoroughly analyze the Glawischnig-Piesczek 
judgment, to clarify its reasoning and actual impact and to rebut some of the 
reactions it had provoked which resulted from an erroneous reading of the, 
admittedly often insufficiently reasoned, judgment. Under a fair reading of 
the judgment, it is by no means a “worst-case-scenario.”
205
Rather, it is a 
correctly limited interpretation of the ECD, endorsing swift and efficient ac-
tions to allow for the removal of illegal online content. Neither are the re-
moval obligations too broad, nor has the Court forgotten about fundamental 
rights.
Most importantly, the judgment does not provide and could not have 
provided any guidance on what kind of speech should be regulated online. 
This culturally highly sensitive topic of the limits of free speech
206
still is 
left to each European country and EU law itself does not contribute to the 
now global debate concerning free speech on the Internet. Rather than shed-
203. Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 50008342, 
at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017).
204. Daskal, supra note 71, at 1631.
205. Contra Daphne Keller (@daphnek), TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/1179750220864745472.
206. For a classic description of the German restrictions on free speech in relation to the 
“Auschwitz lie”, see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against 
the “Auschwitz”—and Other—”Lies”, 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 281–86, 288–304, 320–22
(1986).
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ding any light on this fundamental question, Glawischnig-Piesczek is in-
structive when it comes to the question how content that has been identified 
as illegal should be handled. Glawischnig-Piesczek stands for the proposi-
tion that illegal content must be efficiently and thoroughly removed, and 
that the ISP are primarily responsible in that regard. EU law now allows for, 
but does not mandate, the removal of content that is identical and equivalent 
to initial illegal content already brought to the attention of the ISP. This 
general regulatory orientation is still foreign to U.S. law but would, with 
some creativity, not crash into definitive constitutional obstacles. The (lack 
of) political will to regulate the activities of ISPs seems to be more decisive 
than the constitutional questions in this regard.
The judgment also does not bring and could not have brought much 
clarity to the question of extraterritorial Internet regulation. Instead, the case 
shows the necessity for the development of clearer standards of comity and 
jurisdiction of the digital age.
In all these respects, much work remains to be done and Glawischnig-
Piesczek has only been one important step along the way.

